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The audit of financial statements is set out as a two
person game to illustrate the influence of damages
imposed by society on the strategic choice of both
auditee and auditor. It is assumed: (1) that society can
influence the damages regime for the auditee and the
auditor; (2) that society might be prepared to restrict
damages if the auditor can demonstrate due diligence;
(3) that the auditee can vary his level of care as
regards the accounting process; (4) that the auditor
controls his choice of qualitative and quantitative audit
tests and the form of audit report; and (5) that there
is uncertainty about material error. There are costs and
damages involved. The expected cost is the direct cost
of preparing and carrying out the audit of the financial
statements plus possible damages incurred by both auditee
and auditor whenever the quality of the financial
statements and audit are challenged. The highest damages
are for the issue of a non-qualified audit report on
materially inaccurate financial statements, and the
primary focus of the dissertation is to demonstrate how
these particular damages influence the strategy of the
auditee and the auditor. Two types of game are
considered. The first illustration is of a game in which
the auditee and the auditor cooperate to find the
combined strategy that minimizes the total expected cost.
The second illustration is of a game in which the auditee
and the auditor do not cooperate. In this case, the
joint strategies are found by using the concept of Nash
equilibrium. These illustrations demonstrate that: (1)
for both cooperative and non-cooperative games, the level
of damages determines the auditee and the auditor
strategies; (2) if society wishes to give an inducement
in the form of restricting damages in order to encourage
maximum effort, the size of the required inducement is
less for a cooperative than for a non-cooperative game;
and (3) there are some levels of inducement which
encourage maximum effort irrespective of whether the
auditee and the auditor cooperate.
Le temps par lui-meme ne produit
rien; il est seulement necessaire
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Growth of auditee litigation by different institutions
(e.g., Security Exchange Commission (SEC)) and auditor
litigation by financial statement users has increased
society's awareness of audit expectations. Daily
newspapers and business and financial journals over
recent times have questioned the reliability and the
credibility of the audited financial statements.
This dissertation looks at the interface between auditing
and strategy; hence, it investigates through an audit
interactive setting the influence of damages on the
strategic choices of the auditee/auditor. In other
words, could society influence the choice of strategies
through economic factors such as the level of damages,
and if so, what strategies are required by society's
policy toward auditing?
We use the constructs of game theory to analyze the
auditee and the auditor selected strategies from their
expected economic loss. The selection of a strategy is
limited by the need to meet the audit standards, the
desire to minimize costs, and the power of the tools in
hand. We develop a formal model of audit with a societal
view to increase its welfare through audit, including the
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reliability of audited financial statements. The model
includes a penalty regime which incites the auditee and
the auditor to work hard to avoid a report not being
qualified even though the financial statements are
inaccurate.
The auditee, who is an assertion preparer, has the choice
between taking a high or low level of care in the
preparation of accounting information; however, the
auditor, who is a chartered accountant, could use a
"qualitative" test and/or a more powerful "quantitative"
test before making up his mind about the financial
statements.
The following policy investigations centre on four
possible attitudes that society might take towards the
work performed by the auditee and the auditor. The first
attitude is that the auditee should be employing high
levels of effort in order to reduce the probability of
material error. The second attitude is that the auditor
should be employing a powerful quantitative test in order
to increase the probability of any material error being
discovered. The third attitude is that the auditor
should be employing a qualitative test in order to reveal
the auditee's strategy (defined on page 6). The fourth
attitude is that both the auditee and the auditor should
be employing high levels of effort - the auditee in order
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to reduce the probability of material error, and the
auditor to reveal the auditee's strategy and increase the
probability of any material error being discovered.
Different levels of inducement are introduced to incite
the auditor to select a qualitative test, and to analyze
how inducement could be encouraged to take desirable
actions to prevent a combination of non-qualified opinion
and materially inaccurate statements. The inducement
comes by varying the level of damage.
Background
Most prior research in audit planning has been devoted to
the development of formal models of an audit or its
considered constituent parts with a view to increasing
the efficiency of audit planning and operation whilst
decreasing the risk of litigation or loss of professional
reputation. Most of them rely on a one-person decision
theory which assumes that auditing takes place in a
passive environment where an informational approach is
valid.
This informational approach is valid when the only
objective of the audit is to attest to the "accuracy" of
recording transactions. The auditor uses the result of
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the test on samples to certify the level of accuracy of
the financial statements. It is designed to represent
decision making under uncertainty which does not allow
the audit to influence the behaviour of the auditee,
although these behavioural influences have long been
recognized (see Fellingham and Newman (1985)) by the
auditor.
The auditee chooses his internal control system
considering the auditor behaviour and his effort to avoid
any material error within the financial statements. He
could have observed the auditor's behaviour, and may know
about the audit program, but not exactly about the
auditor's strategy. He could be an ex-auditor himself.
The auditor chooses his audit program to detect any error
within the financial statements. Through his audit test
results, he tries to identify the auditee's policy on his
accounting information system and detect any material
error possibly left in the financial statements. Our
model includes this part of audit; hence, it goes
further by allowing the auditor the opportunity to
observe and reveal the auditee's strategy.
Anderson and Young (1988) suggest that "auditing is a
management tool useful ..., for influencing managers to
take actions consistent with organizational objectives."
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(p. 14). They also argue that anticipation of the audit
can influence the auditee's actions. Fellingham, Newman
and Patterson (1989) report that in most audit settings
the outcome of the audit is not a matter of indifference
to the auditee.
Therefore, according to them, audit models in a passive
environment mean inappropriate conceptualization of the
role of auditing, and procedures derived from these
models relying on a one-person decision theory do not
achieve desired levels of performance; moreover, if an
auditee has incentives to choose actions different from
those mandated or desired by society, sound analysis of
auditing's role requires the explicit recognition of how
the auditee and the auditor interact. Without this
recognition, the evaluation and comparison of the
effectiveness of alternative plans using audit outcomes
will be biased.
Interaction between the auditee and the auditor is usual
in an audit process. For example, the audit fee, as well
as the extent and nature of recording and processing
errors that are discovered, may depend on the accounting
system used. Financial statement users question the
relevance of the financial statements in regard to this
interdependence by alleging collusion between the auditee
and the auditor. Professional organizations, such as the
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Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), have
taken this relationship into account by establishing
professional ethics and generally accepted audit
standards. Cooperation or conflict could arise from
interactions between auditee and auditor.
These interactions could be formulated as a game. A game
is the totality of the rules which describe interaction
between the auditee and the auditor; and assumes that an
array of beliefs is locked together into relational
patterns. In essence, games model interdependence and
conflicts of interest. Interdependence means that the
conseguences of a player's action depend on what action
the other player takes. Conflicts of interest involve
the cost (allocation of resources) of getting the
information.
Auditees and auditors use strategies. A strategy,
according to Thomas (1984) , is a complete description of
the decisions an auditee (auditor) will make in all the
possible situations. Auditees, by selecting and
designing information systems, use other criteria than
the direct cost to make up their minds. They take into
account that their information system will be used as
audit evidence by the auditor.
So far, few research models of auditing use the game
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theoretical framework. Dent (1990) suggests that
although accounting functions in a conflicting domain
with divergent interest needs, research on the interface
between accounting and strategy is, as yet,
underdeveloped.
The game theory models the auditee and the auditor
relationship by describing and solving an idealized
version of reality; for example, all players are
rational, intelligent, and have imperfect information.
The description concerns the representation of the
auditee and the auditor and their preferences, the rules
and strategic possibilities, and the outcomes and
payoffs.
The solution concept is the equilibrium pair. Each
player maximizes his expected payoff following bargaining
with the other player. Hence, neither player will have
an incentive to deviate from such an outcome, given that
his adversary also does not deviate, rendering it a
stable point or equilibrium. This equilibrium pair of
payoff specifies a strategy for each player.
The solution in the cooperative game is the combined
agreed expected payoff of the game, although in the non-
cooperative game it is the Nash equilibrium.
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Because game theory focuses on situations in which there
are two or more rational and interdependent decision
makers, it is especially appropriate for analysis of
influence of cost on the strategic choices of the auditee
and the auditor. Each player is assumed to be a decision
maker who must choose one action from among a set of
possible courses of action. Each player chooses his
action based on information about the expected
conseguences of engaging in that course of action and on
an evaluation of those conseguences. These evaluations
provide for ranking the conseguences in order of
preference. The player then makes a utility-maximizing
choice, based on minimizing his costs. They are
interdependent, in the sense that the outcome of the game
is jointly determined by the choices made by the players;
that is, the choices made by one of them have an effect
on the welfare of the other. This means that a given
player's optimal choice cannot be determined in
isolation, but depends on the choices he expects others
to make.
Reformulating the audit problem in a game theoretic frame
with two players may therefore provide insights into how
the auditee and the auditor select strategies according
to their economic cost; more precisely, can a
satisfactory model, as a game, of the auditee/auditor be
developed? If so, what does it say about effects of
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damages, costs, or players' behaviour? Can these be set
to give satisfactory results for "society"?
Whilst other researchers characterize the audit as only a
non-cooperative game, this dissertation characterizes it
as a cooperative as well as a non-cooperative game. By
doing so it investigates the two extremes of audit
behaviour situations with a regulator looking at the
other players' interests.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2,
audit and game, deals with the basic knowledge of
auditing, decision theory, game theory, cost estimation,
and a survey of the game theory behaviour of auditing
model;
Chapter 3, auditee/auditor game, specifies the
auditee/auditor model by defining the two players and
their strategies, and by pointing out how society can
influence them within the games. It also suggests the
solution to a cooperative and non-cooperative game in
order to analyze the results;
Chapter 4, cooperative games, defines a "pattern" and
explains how we get a combined strategy. Then, it shows
and analyzes seven different patterns resulting from the
cooperative game;
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Chapter 5, non-cooperative games, explains how we get a
joint strategy and shows and analyzes four different
patterns resulting from the non-cooperative game.
Afterwards, two patterns from the cooperative game are
overlapped on two patterns from the non-cooperative game
and the essence is analyzed.
Finally, Chapter 6, conclusion, discusses the policy
implications of explicitly recognizing the influence of
cost on the auditee/auditor's strategic choice, the
effect of inducement, and which game, the cooperative or
the non-cooperative, fits a damages regime properly




Analysis and selection of audit policy need some
structure. The aim of this section is to present the
elements of this structure: a theoretical framework of
auditing, decision theory, game theory, cost estimation,
and literature of audit game theoretical settings. It is
argued that whilst decision theory implies the entire
responsibility of the audit outcome is placed on the
auditor, game theory actually shares this responsibility
between the auditee and the auditor.
Theoretical framework of auditing
What is auditing? Schandl (1978) gives this definition
of auditing:
"Auditing is a human evaluation process to
establish the adherence to certain norms,
resulting in an opinion (or judgment)." (p.4)
Williams (1988) adheres to this definition and presents
the AAA (American Accounting Association) theoretical
framework of auditing shown in Figure 1 (page 12).
This frame relies mainly on the work of Mautz and Sharaf
(1961) which refers to what auditors do. To know more
about the postulates, theoretical concepts, the
11

































Figure 1 Theoretical Framework of Auditing
In this dissertation, we are interested in the impact of
society audit policy on two of the principles of
auditing: the planning of audit work; and the expression
of an opinion. Further, the Statement of Auditing
Standards (SAS) No. 53 expands the auditor's
responsibility to detect a material error. In
particular, it states:
"The auditor should assess the risk that errors
and irregularities may cause the financial
statements to contain a material misstatement.
Based on that assessment, the auditor should
design the audit to provide reasonable
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assurance of detecting errors and
irregularities that are material to the
financial statements."
Indeed, auditors face problems related to the nature of
strategic interactions in assessing audit risk and in
planning audit tests.
Audit risk
The concept of risk is fundamental to auditing. Firstly,
there is the business risk which is the risk that the
auditor will suffer harm because of a client
relationship, even though the audit report rendered for
the client was correct. Secondly, there is the audit
risk which is the risk that the auditor accepts or
rejects the financial statements as free of material
error. Within this dissertation, we focus on the audit
risk when the auditor accepts as free of material error
misstated financial statements. More technically, the
SAS No 47 defines this audit risk as
"the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail
to appropriately modify an opinion of the
financial statements, that are materially
misstated."
It expresses audit risk as a direct function of three
types of risk: inherent risk; control risk; and
detection risk.
The inherent risk is the susceptibility of an account
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balance or class of transactions to error that could be
material. It could be due to hazards but Weick (1988)
concludes about the "inherent hazard." that
"Hazards are not given nor do they necessarily
inhere in organized activity. Instead, they
are often constructed and put into place by
human actors. Their development is
indeterminant rather than fixed,...." (p.314).
So the "inherent risk" could come from hazard and/or
construction by the auditee and/or auditor activities;
it is not just a product from "nature".
The auditee and the auditor can lower this risk.
Schroeder and Verrault (1987) indicate that the relative
risk of an audit engagement is a function of the:
1. reputation and stability of the auditee's management
2. auditee's system of internal control
3. type of financing used by the auditee
4. nature of the auditee's business
5. auditee's rate of growth
6. independence of the auditors
7. longevity of the engagement.
The control risk is the risk that a material error could
occur which would not be prevented or detected on a
timely basis by the system of internal accounting
control. It is the risk that the auditee's system of
internal control will not prevent or correct such errors.
This risk is a function of the auditee's choice of the
14
internal control system and his effort to take care of
the accounting information.
Aldersley (1989) suggests that the auditor's assessment
of control risk is essentially an elicitation process
rather than a sampling process as is the case for
analytical procedures and substantive testing. The
auditor applies procedures that theoretically provide him
with a direct measure of the control risk in a particular
situation.
The detection risk is defined by International Auditing
Guideline [IAG] 1 as follows:
"In forming his opinion on the financial
statements, the auditor carries out procedures
designed to obtain reasonable assurance that
the financial statements are properly stated in
all material respects. Because of the test
nature and other inherent limitations of any
system of internal control, there is an
unavoidable risk that even some material
misstatement may remain undiscovered." (cited
in Bedard (1991)).
In other words, it is the risk that any remaining
material errors will not be detected by the auditor. The
AICPA's SEC Practice Section, which records formal
complaints against the auditor, seems to suggest that the
rate of occurrence of material misstatements in audited
financial statements is less than one-half percent
(Kinney (1988)). Furthermore, Bedard (1991) reports that
only forty-seven percent of the errors in the accounts
receivable were detected and reported to the auditor
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according to the field experiment performed by Caster
(1990). So the auditor's procedures could not disclose
all material errors. It does not necessarily include
undetected management fraud which is much more often a
problem than an error estimation.
SAS No. 53 states that, based on his risk assessment, the
auditor should design an audit to provide reasonable
assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are
material to the financial statements. He could model his
audit based on the decision theory or on game theory.
Decision theory
Decision theory is characterized as looking for
alternative future actions, predicting consequences,
comparing consequences with preferences, and designating
one alternative as the one decided on. Its contents
could be descriptive or normative, although the latter
supports more rationality than the former; but both
share the main assumption that decision-making and
decisions serve the purpose of choice. Some minor
assumptions complete it.
The decision-makers search for the best action among
alternatives. Decision-making solves the problem
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constituted by the existence of alternative actions. The
basic uncertainty thus relates to the alternatives.
Furthermore, Brunsson (1990) argues that "decisions may
allocate responsibility to decision makers and
organisations." (p.47). Therefore, this decision theory
could designate the auditor who is the decision maker
and/or his organization as the only person responsible
for the audit outcome.
The auditor through his audit faces three types of risk.
He encounters the inherent risk which could be borne in
full by the auditee, and the control risk which is
essentially influenced by the auditee. Only the
detection risk is under his control. However, according
to the decision theory, the auditor is the only person
responsible for the audit outcome; but Antle (1982),
using a three-person game model, suggests that the
auditee and the auditor share the audit risk.
Games theory, by modelling interdependence and conflicts
of interest between the auditee and the auditor,
indicates that the consequences of a player's action
depend on what action the other player takes. Each
player as a decision maker chooses his strategy, which
influences the payoff of the game. The players share the
payoff, and each gets his quota. In that way, the
auditor is not the only person designated as responsible
17
for a non-qualified audit report when the financial
statements are inaccurate. The other player, the
auditee, gets some responsibility for the end product.
Within an audit, the decision theory dictates to the
auditor how to solve the problem of uncertainty. He
follows the rules of rational decision-making:
establishing a preference function, listing all possible
alternatives, describing all relevant consequences, and
comparing them with the preference function.
In practice, the problem may be more difficult since the
decision-makers may be uncertain or lack information
about the available alternatives and about the
consequences or the preferences. The normative content
of decision theory handles some aspects of these
complications, but not all, and this could explain why
actual decision-makers do not always follow the norms of
rationality. It is also possible that most decision¬
makers lack capacity or competence for the complicated
information processing required by the rules of rational
decision-making (March & Simon (1958), Huysman (1970),
Kahneman & Tversky (1973), Nisbett & Ross (1982); cited
in Brunsson (1990)).
Consequently, decision-makers, problems, solutions, and
choice opportunities may interact haphazardly, producing
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a certain randomness in choices of alternatives (Cohen et
al. (1972); cited in Brunsson (1990)) while producing
rational decision procedures uncertainty at the same
time.
Bedard (1990) reports that
"having auditors who are not perfectly reliable
in performing compliance tests is realistic
given the results of Waggoner (1990). Thus, in
her experimental study, she found that
auditor's accuracy in detecting control
deviations was less than 60%." (p.11).
This result suggests a weakness in the audit program.
Consequently, a test that includes an examination of the
auditee's strategy and takes into account interaction
between the auditee and the auditor should improve the
auditor's accuracy within his audit program. This test
could be constructed from the theory of indicators and
should reveal the auditee's strategy, including his
effort toward the accounting information system and his
internal control system choice.
The risk borne by the auditor critically depends on the
strategic interactions of the auditor and the auditee.
These interactions cannot be evaluated adequately in a
decision theory, and inferences based on such a model may
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be seriously in error (Fellingham and Newman (1985)).
Newman and Noel (1989) suggest that such an interactive
environment is well suited to investigation using game-
theoretic methods. Game theorists also have recognized
the implications of strategic settings for statistical
inferences in an audit-like environment.
Game theory
The term "game" refers to a model of any social situation
involving two or more decision-makers. Each decision¬
maker, by involving two or more decision-makers, shares
responsibility in the outcome of the game.
The essence of audit is interdependence. The latter
means that the consequences to a player of taking an
action depend not just on that player's action, but also
on what actions the other players take.
So, a game implies at least three components: 1) a list
of players, 2) a list of strategies for each player, and
3) a set of objective functions.
Mathematically, the three components are:
Players, where i = 1,2.
Strategies: Sj belongs to Sj, the strategy set for
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player i.
Objective function, e.g., player i maximizes Uj(sj...sT),
that is, to minimize costs, subject to All i, s;.
Many strategies could be eliminated by using the
dominance argument. According to this principle, if a
row (column) of the game matrix is always less than or
equal to another row (column), then the auditor (auditee)
invariably prefers to use the strategy with the least
cost (greatest payoff) and the dominated strategy need
not appear in the solution.
If a player's vector of payoffs under one strategy is
always less than or equal to any other one of his vectors
of payoffs (e.g., e^. <= e2j., where e;j. is the payoff to
player 1 of his (i)th pure strategy versus player 2 of
his (j)th pure strategy), then the player who minimizes
his costs invariably prefers to use the strategy with the
lowest vector of payoffs (e^.) . Consequently, the
dominated strategy (e2j.) does not have to appear within
the matrix solution. Thus, we can get a reduced game by
using domination on one player's strategies and other
players' strategies. The reduced game will only include
players' strategies whose vectors of payoffs are not
dominated. Thomas (1984) proved that although a
dominated strategy is removed from a game, the solution
of the reduced game is a solution of the original game.
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Strategy is thought to constitute a logic underlying
players' interactions with each other and their
environment, and this in turn guides their deployment of
resources. Cudd (1988) cites Jon Elster who claims that
the essential feature of strategic interaction is the
ability of agents to "globally maximize"; that is, to
look at all possible futures, and to select the best one.
However, strategy is proactive, consciously formulated
prior to decisions and actions and not just a pattern in
a stream of decisions. Moreover, strategies within each
player are not only fabricated internally, but are
constructed out of the interrelations among them.
Once the game has been specified, we can distinguish
between actions (or moves) and strategies. Actions are
the component elements of the game. An action is the
occasion of a choice among various alternatives, to be
made either by one of the players, or by some device
subject to chance, under conditions precisely prescribed
by the rules of the game.
A pure strategy for an auditee or auditor is a plan of
action. It specifies what the auditee (auditor) will do
as a function of what the auditor (auditee) knows at
every juncture in the game. A randomized (mixed)
strategy is a probability distribution on the auditee's
(auditor's) feasible set of pure strategies. The payoff
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function is linear in the randomized strategy of each
player.
A strategy, because it is a plan of action, can be
delegated to an agent. All the agent has to do is follow
the plan embodied in the strategy. However, the main
advantage of thinking in terms of strategies is that they
make possible a compact representation of the game.
These strategies could be adapted to either the
cooperative games, which are games with mixed interests
and enforceable agreements, or to the noncooperative
games which are: (1) games with strictly opposite
interests (zero-sum games); and (2) games with mixed
interests without enforceable agreements.
The strategies are presented in extensive (tree) form
although the model can subsequently be analyzed in normal
(matrix) form. Moulin (1981) defines a NN-normal form
game by the following data:
Let NN be a fixed, finite society, namely a set of
players (agents) with index i.
- for each player i belonging to NN a strategy set S. with
elements s{.
- for each player i belonging to NN a utility function
(or payoff) u,, namely a mapping from SN = X(j belonging t0 M) S,
into R.
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An element s = (s,.) (i ^longing to n> of sn is called an outcome
of the game.
Agent i freely selects a strategy Sj belonging to S,- the
strategy for player i. Once every agent has exercised
his strategic power, an outcome "a" is reached, and agent
i's utility level is then Uj (a).
A small set of idealizations completes this game
theoretical framework. They are: 1. Rational players
maximize expected utility; and 2. Solutions to games are
equilibrium solutions.
1. Rational players maximize expected utility
Players are rational if they make decisions by maximizing
their subjective utility. In game theory, building on
the fundamental results of decision theory, we assume
that each player's objective is to maximize the expected
value on his own payoff, which is measured in some
utility scale.
Myerson (1991) gives this illustration of the
maximization theorem:
"If a decision-maker would prefer option 1 over
option 2 when event A occurs, and he would
prefer option 1 over option 2 when event A does
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not occur, then he should prefer option 1 over
option 2 even before he learns whether event A
will occur or not." (p.3).
Rational players do the best they can in their game.
Their expected behaviour can be represented by a function
which completely orders their objects and obeys their
expected utility.
2. Solutions to games are equilibrium points
An equilibrium point is a set of equilibrium strategies,
one for each of the n players in the game, so that for
each player, if all the other players are playing their
equilibrium strategies, then it is rational for him to do
so as well.
Cost estimation
The audit could generate benefits or costs.
Unfortunately, benefits do not have the same aura of
reliability and objectivity that costs do. Benefits are
too easily subject to manipulation: agents will have an
incentive to misreport their true benefits if this
strategy results in lower assessed costs. To avoid this
manipulation, we use cost models, and our objective
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function is to minimize cost.
Damages which are associated with expected legal costs,
reputation, and penalty may be thought of as a refund
paid by the auditee and/or auditor to society. The limit
on the refund or penalty can be thought of as equal to
the expectation of the additional profits that society
loses from inaccurate audited financial statements.
However, a penalty or refund cannot be unlimited since
the liability of the auditee and/or the auditor would be
bounded by the proven damage and/or their capacity of
payments. This threat should produce equilibria in which
the audit report is informative.
The strategic approach recognizes that auditee and
auditor influence and react to each other's behaviour.
The auditee knows that his behaviour may be detected by
the auditor. The auditor anticipates that his resource
allocation will influence the auditee's behaviour. He
trades off his ability to influence the auditee's
behaviour against the cost of the audit effort. The more
he influences the auditee's behaviour the less cost he
uses for the audit; consequently, the auditee's cost is
greater than in the case in which he is neutral.
Thus, the benefit of an audit is attributed to its




There are previous audit models which use a game
theoretical framework. Antle (1982) models the auditee,
auditor, and owner through a game theoretic foundations
of agency theory. The auditor's behaviour is modeled as
an economic agent. He uses Nash equilibrium as his
solution concept and confines his analysis to pure
strategies. His model is a three-person game with wealth
transference. He shows that the auditee and the auditor
could conspire to disadvantage the owner. He suggests
that the auditee has the possibility of welfare gains
from sharing risk with the auditor.
Antle (1984) examines the auditor's attribute of
independence. He uses his game theoretical model
developed in Antle (1982), a three-person game. He also
confines his analysis to pure strategies. He observes
that if there is a material error in the audited
financial statements, the auditee will bear some risk
because of it. He concludes that owners prefer an
independent auditor to one that is not independent. He
suggests mechanisms by which independence might be
guaranteed. One of them is the role of two types of
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multiperiod effects which are based on observed long-run
frequency of audit reports and changes in the market
value of the auditor's services.
Fellingham and Newman (1985) model the auditee/auditor
interrelationship as a non-cooperative game of imperfect
information and compare the single person decision theory
model to the two-person game model. The behavioural
choices for the auditor relate to a choice as to whether
(or not) to examine the auditee's effort level, and a
choice between a qualified or an unqualified audit
report. They use Nash equilibrium as their solution
concept. Their examples of auditee/auditor games show
that the optimality of various strategies depends on the
interactions of the auditee and the auditor. They
conclude that the auditor single-person decision model is
inadequate to deal with strategic considerations in
auditing where the audit has behavioral implications for
the auditee, and that inferences based on such a model
may be seriously in error.
Anderson and Young (1988) focus on how audit planning and
information-gathering activities may influence the
auditee. They use the auditee/auditor Fellingham and
Newman (1985) model, and look at two audit issues: audit
for fraud; and the use of a risk analysis model. They
show the appropriateness of strategic audit planning
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within a game theoretical framework. Their examples
illustrate that audit plans that neglect the strategic
aspect of auditing can lead to opportunity costs to the
auditor.
Fellingham, Newman and Patterson (1989) describe a two-
person nonzero-sum game where the auditee has multiple
pure strategies for selecting the "error rate", and the
auditor has two strategies ("accept or reject") based on
a sampling. They derive Nash equilibria, and analyze it
within their setting. They study the situation with
costless perfect information, costly perfect information
with fixed cost, and costly imperfect information with
variable cost. Their setting shows that the auditor
prefers more costless information to less, and when the
auditor's information does not reveal the auditee's
strategy perfectly, the auditee will always use a
randomized strategy in equilibrium. They demonstrate
that the auditor's decision to include information
acquisition depends critically on the cost of the
information. They recognize the effects of the auditor's
information acquisition activities on the auditee's
decisions. Their example shows that some of the basic
assumptions in auditing, e.g., optimality of
deterministic sample size, are inappropriate in a game
theory formulation of an audit setting.
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Newman and Noel (1989) set a two-person nonzero-sum game
in which the auditee has two pure strategies for choosing
the "error rate", and the auditor has two strategies
("accept or reject") based on a sampling. They use the
same auditor's choice as Fellingham, Newman and Patterson
(1989). They derive Nash equilibrium solution and
analyze the auditor's trigger value (number of errors for
rejecting a sampling); the probability of material
error? the probability of undetected error; the
probability of incorrect rejection; the probability of
rejection; and they compare their results with the
decision theory results. One of their results suggests
that the auditee's payoffs and the auditor's payoffs
might be of different value to policy-makers. The latter
may prefer to use auditor payoffs as policy instruments
because of the unambiguous effect on undetected errors.
Beck and Jung (1989) use a two-person nonzero-sum game to
model taxpayers' reporting decisions, and characterize
the tax agency's policies in an environment with
uncertainty and information asymmetry. They use a
sequential equilibrium solution (to know more about it,
see Rubinstein (1990), p.152-183). Their analysis
suggests that: (1) complexity creates uncertainty for
taxpayers, so the tax agency may not have strong
incentives to make any simplification; and (2) the
nondisclosure of information about the tax agency audit
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strategy favours it.
To sum up, several authors, through rudimentary models of
the audit using a game theoretical framework of the
three-person game (see Antle (1982; 1984)) and the two-
person game (see Fellingham and Newman (1985) ; Anderson
and Young (1988); Fellingham, Newman and Patterson
(1989); and Newman and Noel (1989)), have commented on
the supremacy of the games theory model as a
characterization of the audit.
In these settings where audits provide value, auditees
affect (through their own choices) the payoffs to
auditors, and auditors (through their own choices) affect
the payoffs to auditees. These audit settings can be
regarded as interactive rather than passive, and they
allow the relation between auditee and auditor and their
interdependence in a social economy.
These authors' contribution has been to develop models of
the audit based on games theory and to contrast them with
the classical decision theory and with Bayesian theory.
These decision theoretic models assume that the error
rate in the population is uninfluenced by the auditor's
choices. Games theory, however, recognizes that the
outcome of the audit is not a matter of indifference to
the auditee, and that the auditee's effort, and hence the
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error rate in the population, is influenced by the
auditee1s anticipation of the auditor's selection of
audit work.
Newman and Noel (1989) suggest that interactive or game
theoretic models of auditing provide a solid foundation
for formalizing and investigating audit prescriptions in
professional standards, legal responsibilities imposed on
the auditee and the auditor by regulatory agencies such
as the SEC, and the effect of the courts and legislators
on auditee and auditor liabilities. According to Moulin
(1981), game theory is a useful, logical device to
explore the auditee/auditor game-like situations
generating tendencies to both cooperative behaviour and
conflict of behaviour.
The model developed in the next chapter differs from the
Antle (1982; 1984) three-person game as it is a two-
person game and allows randomized strategies. Moreover,
for the purpose of providing intelligent audit policies,
different social damages are set. In our model behaviour
on the part of the players, such as fraud, is not taken
into consideration (although game theory could
incorporate such behaviour) except that supplying effort
is considered by both players to be an undesirable
activity. Our interest is in discovering, through
cooperative and non-cooperative games, how a level of
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damages properly managed by society could influence the
choice of auditee and auditor strategies?
Our auditor's behavioural choices are made more extensive
than those offered in Fellingham and Newman (1985) by
adding to them a choice as to the extent of transaction
testing. Our auditee's behavioural choice is the same as
Fellingham and Newman (1985), and Newman and Noel (1989),
but differs from Fellingham, Newman and Patterson (1989)
in that in our model, the auditee has only two pure
strategies for selecting his effort level.
Through a game theoretical framework of auditing, this
dissertation looks at the impact of different damages
allocations from society on the behaviours of auditees
and auditors. Previous research is extended by adding
another auditor choice to the Fellingham and Newman
(1985) model, simultaneously modelling auditee and
auditor strategies within a cooperative game, and
investigating the effects of the cost on the
auditee/auditor strategy choices within a cooperative and
a non-cooperative game.
The next chapter is concerned with the setting of an




This section defines the two players and their strategies
within the auditing game. It then points out how
society, as an interested party, can affect the game. It
also identifies the players' objective function and
suggests a solution to both the cooperative and the non-
cooperative game. Finally, numbers are specified to the
different parameters and the sensitive parameters are
identified.
The game consists of choices, probabilities, costs and
damages. The probabilities and damages are combined and
added to costs to give the expected payoffs of each
possible strategy for the auditee and the auditor, who
are the two players in the game.
The purpose is not to propose this specific model as a
guide to select audit policy, but to illustrate the
importance of a properly managed damages regime for the
control of auditee and auditor behaviour.
Players
The setting uses two players: an auditee and an auditor.
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Auditee
The term "auditee" refers to the assertion preparer
(asserter). He can be viewed as an employee of the
audited firm (person acting as an agent or trustee for
other people's interests) but he "owns" the control
system and has the responsibility for initiating
corrective action. He is the party who provides the
financial statements for the auditor to perform the
"attest" function which is the role of verifying and
certifying the financial statements made by him.
Auditor
The term "auditor" refers to a chartered accountant. His
social status is set in a highly institutionalized rule
(both normative and cognitive) for auditing as well as a
social role made up of particular behaviours, relations,
and expectations. Many of his procedures are enforced by
public opinion, by the views of important constituents,
by knowledge legitimated through the educational system,
by the laws and by the definitions of negligence and
prudence used by the courts. Complying with professional
ethics and generally accepted audit standards, he
performs, with competence and in good faith, an audit,
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and renders an opinion on financial statements.
The interested party
The interested party is named "society". The term
"society" refers to the population at large, inclusive of
investors and other users of financial statements, but
exclusive of auditees and auditors. This is adapted from
the meaning ascribed to the word in the Cohen Commission
Report (1978), cited in Porter (1992).
Society's interest is the study of policy-making. Lynn
(1986) defines it as:
"the study of behaviour and its consequences: the
behaviour of individuals, groups, and organisations
that produce or mediate the social conditions to
which policymakers react." (p.379).
In our model, society is interested in the behaviour of
the auditee and the auditor who produce audited financial
statements and in the effects of damages imposed by
regulators and courts on the auditee and the auditor.
More precisely, it is concerned with unqualified
financial statements when there is a material error.
These worsen the social conditions and exerts pressures
on policymakers to shape better audit policies.
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Society uses law, regulators like SEC, and Chartered
Accountant (CA) institutions to implement, represent, and
monitor their audit policy. In that way, it shares the
responsibility for audited financial statements between
the auditee and the auditor. As an ultimate resource,
the use of regulators and the court system assures the
application of their policy by the auditee and the
auditor. But society is not a player in the game, as its
role is an a priori choice of cost functions.
The next section deals with the components of strategies.
Strategies
Strategy could be defined as a player's plan adapted to
its environment. Mathematically, each player has a
strategy, Sj, belonging to a set of strategies, Sf.
The game consists essentially of amending a typical
statistical decision problem. The behavioural choices of
auditee and auditor influence the probability of a
material error observation in the financial statements.
The economic burden influences the behaviour of the
auditee and the auditor. Society through regulators
monitors the auditee and the auditor behaviour. It is
firstly interested in influencing the auditor behaviour,
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as suggested by Newman and Noel (1989), which appears to
be easiest to influence. He is the last one to agree
that the financial statements as free from material
error.
Society through regulators and the court system could
influence the auditor's behaviour to protect its
interest; that is, to give the right signal. It takes
into account the use of a specific test by the auditor in
the event of a failure to qualify a materially inaccurate
set of financial statements.
The players do not know the true state of accounting
information. The label (E) identifies the state of error
and (NE) the state of no error of accounting information.
The auditee labelled (EE) is allowed to have preferences
about the outcome of evidence. He decides what level of
care he will allocate to the accounting information
system. This level could be high (H) or low (L) and it
is not known by the auditor. Hence, a high level of care
is costlier than a low one.
The auditor, designated (OR), could choose a powerful
qualitative test or powerful quantitative test or both.
The qualitative tests labelled A1 and A2 are a different
set of tests. The powerful qualitative test named A1
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Table 1 States, choices, and test outcomes
States of Accounting Information
E = The accounting information is materially in
error.
NE = The accounting information is not materially in
error.
Auditee's Choices
H = The auditee provides a high level of care in
processing accounting information.
L = The auditee provides a low level of care in
processing accounting information.
Auditor's Choices
A1 = The auditor chooses a test to observe perfectly
the auditee's choice (strategy) although it does
not reveal whether there is a material error in
the processing of the accounting information.
A2 = The auditor chooses not to observe the
auditee's strategy.
B1 = An extended test capable of providing high
quality evidence as to whether the accounting
information is materially in error.
B2 = A less extensive test than B,, capable of
providing evidence as to whether the accounting
information is materially in error.
Q = The audit report is qualified.
NQ = The audit report is not qualified.
B Test Outcomes
oM = The test B (B1 or B2) signals (i.e., provides
evidence) that accounting information is
materially in error.
oNH = The test B signals that accounting information
is not materially in error.
reveals perfectly to the auditor the auditee's strategy,
but the qualitative test named A2 does not let him know
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how much effort the auditee has contributed. Moreover,
the test A2 may be no test at all. However, the auditor
has the opportunity to observe the auditee level of care
in preventing the occurrence of a material error before
deciding on which quantitative test to choose.
The quantitative tests B1 and B2 are also a different set
of tests. They provide a signal as to whether the
accounting information is materially (oM) or non-
materially (oNM) in error, but the powerful quantitative
test noted B1# which implies extended audit procedures,
has higher probability of matching the state of
accounting information (error or no error) than the one
noted B2. Hence a powerful test is costlier than a less
powerful one. Table 1 (page 38) summarizes the states of
accounting information, players' choices, and B test
outcomes.
Internal control system
The internal control system is the essence of the control
risk. It is the auditee's duty to design the proper
internal control system and operate it adequately.
Designing consists of establishing policies and
procedures to assist in achieving the objective of
ensuring the orderly and efficient conduct of the
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entity's business. This control system must be cost
beneficial.
The operative care complements the designed internal
control system by allocating effort to maintaining a
reliable system, ensuring timely preparation of reliable
information, safeguarding assets, optimizing the use of
resources and preventing and detecting error and fraud.
The design and the level of operative care are influenced
by the auditee and are part of the audit control risk.
Fellingham and Newman (1985) suggest three different
design levels: effective internal control, weak internal
control, and dependent internal control.
An effective internal control has a very operative
internal control regardless of the level of care taken by
the auditee. His level of care does not significantly
make a difference in terms of reduced error probability.
A weak internal control has a particularly ineffective
internal control independent of the level of care taken
by the auditee. His level of care does not significantly
make a difference in terms of reduced error probability.
A dependent internal control has an internal control
highly conditional on the level of care taken by the
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auditee. His level of care could make a significant
difference in terms of reduced error probability.
Fellingham and Newman (1985) illustrate a very effective
and a dependent internal control system. Their examples
reveal that the very effective internal control system
results in a pure strategy, but the dependent internal
control system suggests randomized strategies. We must
remember that a pure strategy for an auditee or auditor
is a plan of action; it specifies what the auditee
(auditor) will do as a function of what the auditor
(auditee) knows at every juncture in the game. A
randomized strategy is a probability distribution on the
auditee's (auditor's) feasible set of pure strategies.
Although we do not use these three distinctions
(effective, weak or dependent internal control system),
we do use what Fellingham and Newman (1985) call a
dependent internal control to include the randomized
strategies in our examples.
Rationality
Auditees (auditors) are rational if they make decisions
by maximizing their subjective utility; for a risk-
neutral auditee (auditor); that is, an auditee (auditor)
whose utility functions are linear in profit, this is the
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same as minimizing expected cost. The game theory model
is not limited to a rational auditee (auditor), although
it can accommodate an irrational auditee (auditor) if his
irrational tendencies are known. However, Beck and Jung
(1989); Fellingham and Newman (1985) ; Fellingham,
Newman and Patterson (1989); and Newman and Noel (1989),
set the auditee and the auditor as instantaneous rational
agents.
One extreme view of economics says agents obey the
rationality and optimization postulates at all times and
in all circumstances. The other views have the agents
making a sub-optimal approach. Over time and in repeated
games, they strive to uncover better strategies; thus
decisions may be expected to approach optimal behaviour.
In this dissertation, we assume that agents obey the
rationality and optimization postulates at all times and
in all circumstances.
Intelligent
Auditees (auditors) are intelligent if they recognize
each other as rational. An intelligent auditee (auditor)
can put himself in the auditor's (auditee's) position and
reason from his point of view.
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Auditee's behaviour
Audit is an established product characterized by a
relative homogeneity. There is a virtually negligible
product differentiation. In general, the auditee does
not highly value the rewards that a specific auditor can
supply. He is not interested in the most competent audit
or the most accurate statement of his financial position;
instead, he wants to secure statements that he expects
will have a particular impact on society, including
financial markets.
Three sets of auditees hire auditors: group I - auditees
that are required to hire auditors and would have done so
without regulation; group II - auditees that are
required to hire auditors but would not have done so
without regulation; and group III - auditees that are
not required to hire auditors but would strategically do
so with or without regulation. As regards group III,
Antle (1984) suggests that one of the auditee incentives
is that the market uses the audited financial statements
to evaluate their performance. But, according to Melumad
and Thoman (1990), mandated auditing is a special case of
an unmandated audit setting; consequently, in our
setting we do not differentiate among the auditee groups
although there is more than one group of them.
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In seeking to minimize his costs and damages, the auditee
designs the internal control system and decides what
effort to make to prevent material errors. Once the
internal control system is identified, this setting can
be viewed only as an analysis of the auditee's effort to
prevent the occurrence of material error; thus the
probability of a material error is a function of both the
auditee's action and some random influence.
Therefore, the auditee's behavioural choices within this
setting relate to the level of care which he employs in
the production of the financial statements. His
behavioural choices influence the probability of material
error in the production of the accounting information.
His choice acknowledges the auditor's strategy because
auditors usually act according to accounting rules and
audit procedures which themselves respond to the auditee
choices.
In equilibrium, the auditee must recognize how his
reported financial statements will affect the expected
audit cost assessed by the auditor, and take this into
account when making his reporting decisions. It is
assumed that the auditee's level of care complements the
accounting information system. Although, being human, he
could worsen it, it is assumed that the probability of a
material error is lower given his high level of care.
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It is assumed that the auditee does not make intentional
errors, although the strategic approach could incorporate
the possibility of both intentional and unintentional
error. It is also assumed that there is no overt wish on
the part of the auditee to produce financial statements
with material error, e.g., fraud, but merely a wish,
other things being equal, to minimize his costs.
However, because high care is costly, he prefers to
expend a low level (L) rather than a high level (H) of
care. Thus, the auditee behaviour choices differ from
that of Anderson and Young (1988) and of Shibano (cited
in Newman and Noel (1989)) who assume that the auditee
may wish to make a false report.
The auditee prefers the auditor to acquiesce, but the
auditor would do so only when his damages are relatively
low.
Auditor's behaviour
In seeking to minimize his expected damages, the auditor
has two decisions to make: which audit strategies to
design and what to report given his "findings". This
setting assumes that both the auditee and the auditor
know the probability of material error being allowed by
the internal control system, and the performance
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characteristics of the audit tests. We must remember
that the auditee designs and operates the internal
control system, and the auditor's assessment of control
is an elicitation process from his understanding of the
design and operation of the control environment, of the
accounting system, and of control procedures. The
performance characteristics of the audit tests are known
from anterior audits and the statistical power of the
audit test.
The behavioural choices for the auditor within this
setting relate to: (1) a choice (A1 or A2) as to whether
(or not) to examine the auditee's level of care; (2) a
choice (B1 or B2) as to the extent of audit procedures to
detect a material error; and (3) a choice as to the form
of audit report issued (qualified or non-qualified). The
design of test A1 reveals more precisely than test A2 the
level of the inherent and control risk borne by the
auditee. However, the design of test B1 has higher
probability than test B2 to detect a material error
(detection risk).
It is deliberate that many of the institutional
characteristics of audit, such as detailed review of
internal control, test of details, etc., are ignored.
Inclusion of them would not alter the central issue but
would make the model unmanageable. These behavioural
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choices are more extensive than those offered in
Fellingham and Newman (1985) in which the auditor's
choices are restricted to (1) and (3).
The auditor has an incentive to examine the auditee1s
level of care, due to uncertainty regarding the auditee's
level of care. This information may not be worthwhile or
looked up.
He also has an incentive to conduct other audit tests due
to uncertainty regarding the outcome of random factors
affecting the audit (e.g., inherent risk). He could
therefore choose from any statistical or judgmental audit
procedures between an extended and not extended audit
procedure to detect material error. The extended test
signals at a more reliable level of confidence whether a
material error has been discovered or not discovered.
It is assumed that he prefers less audit procedures than
more; because additional audit work is costly, he
prefers to not examine the auditee's strategy and to not
extend the testing.
The interested party behaviour
It should be remembered that society is interested in the
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study of the behaviour of the auditee and the auditor,
and in the influence it can exert on the audit policies
by allowing incentives. In our model, it is concerned
with the event of a non-qualified audit opinion when the
financial statements are materially inaccurate.
Society, through regulators, a court system and a
properly managed damages regime, will ensure that both
the auditee and the auditor work hard and report
truthfully. Members of society deal with the final
product; that is, the audited financial statements. The
auditor is the last one who agrees to the accuracy of the
financial statements. Newman and Noel (1989) suggest the
use of auditor payoff as a policy instrument. Therefore,
society uses incentives through its damages regimes to
influence, in our model, the auditor's behaviour.
One economical way to influence the auditor's payoff is
to offer an inducement associated with particular auditor
behaviour. This inducement could be to set at only a
percentage of the total damages otherwise suffered by the
auditor in the event of a failure to qualify a materially
inaccurate set of financial statements. This inducement,
labelled "n", is introduced in order to recognize that
where an auditor fails to qualify a materially inaccurate
set of financial statements, the damages imposed by
society are likely to be influenced by the care taken by
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the auditor.
It is assumed that society will recognize care being
taken if the auditor plays test A1, which reveals the
auditee's strategy; this restrains the auditor's damages
to a percentage "n" (n < 1.00) of the total damages that
would otherwise be incurred. The inducement "n" is a
function of auditor's effort to employ test A1. The
assumption is that society would wish to give the auditor
an incentive to play test A,; hence to observe the
auditee's level of effort. Thus, although the game
admits the possibility of damages being imposed on the
auditee, there is a presumption that the primary target
of any damages would be the auditor.
The interpretation of "n" could be seen as societal
intervention to motivate the auditor to perform an audit
according to society's expectations; that is, the
incentive. To sum up, it is assumed that society
encourages the auditor to perform the test A1 within his
audit.
Potential costs and damages
Suppose that auditees and auditors are modelled as
economic agents who act to maximize expected utility. Do
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auditees and/or auditors then have the right incentive to
work hard and report truthfully? In a single period,
setting the typical solution would call for an
arbitrarily large penalty such as lawsuits or termination
of employment to be imposed on the auditee and/or on the
auditor when shirking is detected. In a general
multiperiod case, current and future period effects would
both be present in the solution. This model uses
expected costs and damages which fit a multiperiod
framework.
The process of preparing and auditing the annual
financial statements generates expected costs and
damages. Audit related costs are attributable to the
effort required in preparing and auditing the financial
statements, and the various damages attributable to the
state of accounting information coupled with the audit
opinion. Therefore, costs are the costs of preparation
and audit, and damages include loss of reputation when
things go wrong, the costs of preparing defence, and of
professional advice when challenged by a disaffected user
and/or an appropriate authority.
As in Fellingham and Newman (1985), it is assumed that
there are various potential costs and damages associated
with the decisions of the auditee and the auditor. If
the auditee takes a high level of care in processing
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accounting information, his fixed cost is DH; otherwise,
it is arbitrarily set at zero. If the auditor selects
test A1 to acknowledge the auditee's strategy, his fixed
cost is CA1; otherwise the cost of A2 is arbitrarily set
at zero. Selection of the extended test B1 commands a
fixed cost of CB1; otherwise the cost of B2 is arbitrarily
set at zero.
The tests' cost for test A, and test B1 is the marginal
cost; that is, the supplementary cost respectively over
test A2 and test B2. If the audit information (group I
and II of auditees) is required by a third party (e.g.,
an investor, stockholder, creditor, bank, or prospective
buyers) or some other body monitoring the organization,
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
auditee benefits indirectly by fulfilling the
requirement. And usually he perceives the benefit to be
equal to or in excess of the cost of the audit, and he
therefore considers it reasonable to assume the expenses.
In the case of auditees (group III) who hire an auditor
anyway, as the auditee is assumed rational, the audit
benefit is at least equal to its cost; but more work
imposes a cost on the auditee and the auditor.
The audit cost is generally dependent on the accounting
system employed and influenced by the choice of audit
program. Demski and Swieringa (1974) suggest that the
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auditee controls action and system choice, while the
auditor controls audit program choice and they share the
whole cost which they jointly influence. The auditor
receives a fee net of the cost actually borne by him, and
the auditee receives the balance. Consequently, the
cost's alteration harms at least one of them.
The cost of tests A2 and B2 arbitrarily set at zero is the
same as Fellingham and Newman (1985); although, in a
more realistic setting, the market force would determine
audit costs. However, this assumption is made strictly
to simplify the analysis. Relaxing it would not alter
any of the qualitative results.
In addition to the above costs, it is anticipated that
specific damages, including fines, could if necessary be
imposed by regulators and/or courts (society) upon
auditees when they issue defective financial statements
and upon auditors when they fail to qualify a materially
inaccurate set of statements, or upon both of them.
The auditee, as an agent, faces costs, legal liability,
and exposure risk subsequent to an audit. Beck and Jung
(1989) observe that the cost borne by him represents the
opportunity cost of time spent preparing extra
information for the audit, professional fees paid to
advisors, and disutility for the audit experience.
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Consequent to his choices (see Table 1, page 38), an
auditor faces legal liability and exposure risk from
financial statement users, including free riders. The
legal liability commands a performance of duties judged
to be inadequate (negligence). The exposure risk might
occur from the issuance of a technically inappropriate
audit opinion.
The possible consequences of these major components are
economic loss and/or impaired reputation. The costs of
preparing defence under challenge can be significant even
though the process of preparing and auditing the
financial statements was competent. In or out of court
settlements can be substantial, but have been generally
diffused through the operation of professional indemnity
insurance. However, too often substantial settlements
could lead to a shortage of capacity in the insurance
market. Consecutively to settlements, reputation is
affected and subsequently revenue, job security, power,
esteem from others, and/or self-esteem. Table 2 (page
54) summarizes the potential costs and damages to the
auditee and the auditor.
If the auditor does not qualify and the state of
accounting information is good (no material error), his
expected damages are CNQNE and the auditee's expected
damages are DNQNE; and if the state of accounting
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Table 2 Costs and Damages
Auditee's cost
Dh = The auditee's direct cost of expending high
level of care (H); the direct cost of low level
of care (L) is arbitrarily set at zero.
Auditor's costs
CA1 = The auditor's direct cost of carrying out test
A1; the direct cost of test A2 is arbitrarily set
at zero.
CB1 = The auditor's direct cost of carrying out the
extended test B1; the direct cost of test B2 is
arbitrarily set at zero.
Auditor's damages
Cqe = The expected damage to the auditor of
qualifying when there is material error.
Cnqe = The expected damage to the auditor of not
qualifying when there is material error.
Cqne = The expected damage to the auditor of
qualifying when there is not material error.
Cnqne = The expected damage to the auditor of not
qualifying when there is not material error.
Auditee's damages
Dqe = The expected damage to the auditee of a
qualified opinion, given a material error in the
accounting information.
Dnqe = The expected damage to the auditee of a non¬
qualified opinion, given a material error in the
accounting information.
Dqne = The expected damage to the auditee of a
qualified opinion, given no material error in the
accounting information.
Dnqne = The expected damage to the auditee of a non¬
qualified opinion, given no material error in the
accounting information.
information is bad (material error) his expected damages
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are CNQE and the auditee's damages are DNQE. If the auditor
qualifies and the state of accounting information is good
(no material error) , his expected damages are C°ME and the
auditee's expected damages are D0^. If the auditor
qualifies and the state of accounting information is bad
(material error), his expected damages are C°E and the
auditee's expected damages are DQE. These expected
damages aggregate all current and future consequences of
the joint actions of the auditor and auditee, including
effects on revenues, costs of errors, lawsuit losses and
reputation.
We will now explain the distinctions among the auditor's
expected damages associated with the auditor's action and
the state of accounting information.
The auditor's expected damages for a qualification
outcome where an error is correctly detected (C°E) are
costs of negotiation and other disutility arising from
dealing with the auditee.
The auditor's expected damages for a non-qualification
outcome where an error is not detected (CNQE) when
discovered are costs of lawsuit and loss of reputation,
together with any penalty which might be imposed by a
regulatory authority.
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The auditor's expected damages for a qualification
outcome where the accounting information is not in error
(C°NE) are costs of negotiation and other disutility
arising from dealing with the auditee, and spoiled
reputation.
The auditor's expected damages for a non-qualification
outcome where there is no error (CNQNE) is the cost of
being in the audit business; that is, there is no
additional cost beyond the cost of the initial audit
effort except the exposure risk or insurance cost.
The order of these damages is not straightforward.
Professional auditing pronouncements typically define
audit risk as the risk that the auditor has failed to
qualify the audit opinion for a materially inaccurate set
of financial statements. Fellingham and Newman (1985)
assume that CQE<CNQE, Newman and Noel (1989) assume that
Cnqne<Cnqe and Cqe<Cnqe, and Anderson and Young (1988) assume
that Cnqne<Cqe<Cqne<Cnqe for the auditor within their examples
of the auditee/auditor game.
To sum up, Cnqe is the costliest, CNQNE is the least costly,
and Cqne is costlier than CQE. It is assumed, as in
Anderson and Young (1988), through our model that the
auditor expected relative damages are CNQNE<CQE<CQNE<CNQE.
Hence C°NE and CNQE are the highest costs, with a failure to
57
qualify a material inaccuracy being the highest of all.
The distinctions among the auditee's expected damages
associated with the auditor action and the state of
accounting information are now explained.
The damages of a qualification outcome where an error is
correctly detected (DQE) reflects that the benefits of an
error when it is not discovered are not realized. The
auditee exposes himself to adverse reaction of the market
to a qualification, and to other damages which should not
arise if the error has not been discovered.
The damages of a non-qualification outcome where an error
is not correctly detected (DN0E) reflect that sometimes
the benefits of error are realized. The auditee,
sometimes avoids the damages discussed above when the
auditor does not qualify the financial statements.
Fellingham and Newman (1985) and Newman and Noel (1989)
assume DNQE<DQE. They differentiate between the auditee's
damages when the accounting information is in error,
given that the auditor qualifies (DQE) and does not
qualify (DNQE) based on the probability of error
discovery. They state that although the realized damage
of an error when discovered may be viewed as the same in
either case, the expected damages are assumed to be much
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lower given no qualification because the probability of
discovery with attendant damages is likely to be lower
than if qualification occurred.
The damages of a qualification outcome where the
accounting information is accurate (DQNE) are the
disutility of negotiations with the auditor, as well as
instances where the absence of error is never detected
but settled through negotiations. Before the auditee
agrees on a qualified report, he asks the auditor to make
more tests to fit the qualified report. In practice, the
auditee could ask for another audit by another auditor,
but by the time he will get it, the audit signal will be
too late as the next year's audit could be ready.
Newman and Noel (1989) assume DQNE<DQE. They argue that
although the auditee's probability of subsequent
discovery is constant, the damages imposed on him are
greater if it is material error that is subsequently
discovered.
The damages of a non-qualification outcome where the
accounting information is accurate (DNQNE) are the risk of
the audit business. They include the preparation, cost
of consultancy, the stress, anticipation effect and the
disutility of audit.
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Newman and Noel (1989) posit that auditee's damages
D°ne<Dqe and DNQE<D°E implies DNQNE<DNaE if the auditee does not
have a dominant strategy. The latter formula means that
the probability of discovering an error when there is
none is lower than when there is an error, although
within the two cases the auditor does not qualify the
financial statements.
In conclusion, DQE is the costliest, DNQNE is the least
costly, and DQNE is costlier than DNQE meaning that
dNQne<dNQe<d°ne<dQe* However, to look at the sensitivity of
Dnqe which agrees to the auditor's action, we assume
through our model that the auditee expected relative
damages are DNQNE<DQNE<D°E and that DNQNE<DNQE where there is no
intention or wish to benefit from an error.
Consequently, this approach differs from that of Anderson
and Young (1988), who assume that in an audit fraud
setting DNQE<DNQNE<DQNE<DQE where the auditee benefits from an
intentional error. As the auditor selects the action to
both, our dissertation looks at the simultaneous
sensitivity of auditor damages CNQE and auditee's damages
DNQE.
Probability along with potential damages
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The auditee's level of care influences the accounting
information system in such a way that the probability of
material error (inherent and control risk) is lower given
higher effort. A high and a low level of care reduce
respectively to a conditional probability "p" and "g" the
frequency of material error. The auditee's effort could
create error. It is assumed that the auditee's high
level of care does not create more error than his low
effort. The probability "p" is therefore equal to or
lesser than the probability "q" (p=<q).
Fellingham and Newman (1985) suggest the following
interpretation of this characterization of "p" and "q":
if both "p" and "q" are low, the internal control is very
effective regardless of the level of care taken by the
auditee (effective internal control); if both are high,
the internal control system is particularly weak, again
independent of the auditee's level of care (weak internal
control); if "p" is low while "q" is high, the internal
control system is highly dependent on the auditee's level
of care (dependent internal control). Our model adopts
the last situation with the internal control chosen by
the auditee and part of his care.
Knowing the auditee's strategy (through A1) decreases the
uncertainty about the auditee's actual work. Society
inducement labelled "n" weights only the auditor's
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Table 3 Probabilities along with damages
p = The probability that the accounting information
is materially in error if the auditee applies
high effort (H): P(material error/H ).
q = The probability that the accounting information
is materially in error if the auditee chooses low
effort (L): P(material error/L ).
n = The percentage of the total damage otherwise
suffered by the auditor by which the authorities
would agree if the auditor has employed the test
r = The probability that the test B., signals a
material error given there is a material error in
the accounting information: PIB, signals a
material error / there is a material error).
t = The probability that the test B1 signals a
material error given there is no material error
in the accounting information: P(B^ signals a
material error / there is no material error).
v = The probability that the test B2 signals a
material error given there is a material error in
the accounting information: P(B2 signal a
material error / there is a material error).
w = The probability that the test B2 signals a
material error given there is no material error
in the accounting information: P(B? signals a
material error / there is no material error).
damages of non-qualifying when the accounting information
is error CNQE; that is, he does not qualify when the
accounting information is bad (material error). Later,
"n" is varied to test the sensitivity; that is, incentive
is altered by society, of the game to this variable. No
consideration is given in this dissertation to the effect
of a similar inducement for the auditee in order to
encourage high effort by the auditee. Thus, although the
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game admits the possibility of damages being imposed on
the auditee, there is a presumption that the primary
target of any damages regime would be the auditor.
The extended test B, increases the power of the test B to
uncover a material error (detection risk). Its
probability of signalling a material error when there is
a material error is "r", and of signalling a material
error when there is no material error is "t" (false
positive). B2 test probability of signalling a material
error when there is a material error is "v", and of
signalling one when there is none is "w" (false
positive).
It is assumed that "r" is equal to or greater than "v" (r
>= v) and "t" is equal to or lesser than "w" (t<=w).
This test B1 is in all respects a better test than B2.
Respectively, all of these probabilities vary between
zero and one and the expected damages of both players are
weighted accordingly. Table 3 (page 61) summarizes the
probabilities.
Formulae for payoffs
Table 4 (page 64) shows the expected damages resulting
from the auditor's choice of test A (A1 or A2) and his
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assessment before he uses a B's test. For example, the
first line starting with A1 means that the auditor has
chosen test A1, he does not qualify, and his damages are
nCN° if the accounting information is in error; otherwise
it is C1iNQNE*





















Note that "n" weights only CNQE, the damages associated
with the combination of non-qualified opinion and
materially inaccurate financial statements, and with the
auditor's choice of test A1.
Table 5 illustrates the consequences related to the
signal of test B combined with the auditor's actions.
For example, the first line starting with 0M means that
the first auditor's observation is a material error (0M) ,
he does not qualify, and if the state of accounting
information is in error he misclassifies a material
error; otherwise, he classifies a non-material one
correctly.
64









0,M Not qualify Misclassify a Classify a non-
material error material error
correctly
0NH Not qualify Misclassify a Classify a non-
material error material error
correctly












Notice that the likelihood that the auditor will observe
a material error is dependent on both the auditee's
strategy, since the probability of an error is affected
by his level of care; and the auditor's strategy, since
the tests B, and B2 have different probabilities of
signalling an error.
Table 6 shows the combined probabilities associated with
auditor's choice and different expected damages for him.
We must remember that society uses an inducement "n" if
the auditor has chosen test A1. Except when the auditor
does not qualify and the accounting information is in
error, his choice between tests A1 and A2 does not matter.
For example, rpC°E (left first line) means that the
auditor has chosen test B1 (probability "r"), the auditee
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Table 6 Probabilities along with auditor's payoff
Payoff and probability that test B signals a
material error and there is an error
Tests Qualify Non-Qualify<1)
H L H L
b, rPC°E rqC°E rpnCNQE rqnCNQE
b2 vpC°E vqC°E vpnCNQE vqnCNQE
Payoff and probability that test B signals
non-material error and there is an error
a
b, (l-r)pCQE (l-r)qCQE (1-r) pnCNQE (1-r) qnCNQE
b2 (l-v)pCQE (l-v)qCQE (1-v) pnCNQE (1-v) pnCNQE
Payoff and probability that
material error and there
test B signals
is not an error
a
bI t(l-p)CQNE t (1-q) C°NE t(l-p)CNQNE t(l-p)CN0NE
b2 w(l-p)CQNE w(l-q)CQNE w (1-p) Cnqne w (1-q) Cnqne
Payoff and probability that test B signals a

















(1) This table present the results when the auditor
has employed test A1 which reveals the auditee's
strategy. If he has employed test A2, "n" when it
appears is always equal to one.
has selected high care (probability "p"), the auditor
qualifies, and the accounting information is in error.
A fixed cost to the extended transaction test is set so
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that data describing the state of non-material error is
as expensive to get as data describing the state of a
material error.
Let us characterize the game in extensive form.
Extensive form
Table 7 and Table 8 show the game in extensive (tree)
form. Firstly, the auditee chooses between high and low
(L or H) level of care of the accounting information
system. Secondly, the auditor chooses between knowing
(A,) or not knowing (A2) the auditee's strategy that is
his level of effort L or H on the accounting information
system. Thirdly, he chooses between extending (B.,) or not
extending (B2) the transaction test. Observe that if he
chooses A2, he is unable to determine whether the auditee
has selected L or H.
The expected payoffs of the auditee and the auditor are
based on the expected costs and damages previously
defined, along with the probability of incurring those
damages. For example, consider the following strategy
combinations: the auditee has chosen H; the auditor has
chosen A1; the auditor has chosen B2 and does not qualify
(NQ), no matter if a material error is found or not. The
67
Table 7 Normal form, auditee's choice H
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Table 8 Normal form, auditee's choice L
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auditor's payoff is the sum of the expected cost and
damages of:
CA1, the direct cost of test A1 ; plus
vpnCNQE, the damages of non-qualifying an inaccurate set
of financial statements, times the percentage (n) of
paying the damage, times the probability (p) of error
given the auditee's choice H, times the probability (v)
that the test B2 reveals a material error given that there
is one; plus
(l-v)pnCNQE, the damages of non-qualifying an inaccurate
set of financial statements, times the percentage (n) of
paying the damage, times the probability (p) of error
given the auditee's choice H, times the probability (1-v)
that the test B2 does not reveal a material error given
that there is one; plus
w(l-p) Cnqne, the damages of non-qualifying an accurate set
of financial statements, times the probability (1-p) that
there is no error given the auditee's choice H, times the
probability (w) that the test B2 reveals a material error
given that there is not one; plus
(1-w) (1-p) Cnqne, the damages of non-qualifying an accurate
set of financial statements, times the probability (1-p)
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that there is no error given the auditee's choice H,
times the probability (1-w) that the test B2 does not
reveal a material error given that there is not one.
To sum up, the auditor's total expected cost equals
CA1 + vpnCNQE + (1-v) pnCNQ£ + w(l-p)CNQNE + (1-w) (1-p) CNQNE.
Similarly, the auditee's payoff is the sum of the
expected cost and damages of:
Dh, the direct cost of expending high care; plus
vpDNQE, the damages of a non-qualified audit report of an
inaccurate set of financial statements, times the
probability (p) of error given his choice H, times the
probability (v) that the test B2 reveals a material error
given that there is one; plus
(l-v)pDNQE, the damages of a non-qualified audit report of
an inaccurate set of financial statements, times the
probability (p) of error given his choice H, times the
probability (1-v) that the test B2 does not reveal a
material error given that there is one; plus
w(1-p) Dnqne, the damages of a non-qualified audit report of
an accurate set of financial statements, times the
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probability (1-p) that there is no error given his choice
H, times the probability (w) that the test B2 reveals a
material error given that there is not one; plus
(1-w) (1-p) DNQME, the damages of a non-qualified audit
report of an accurate set of financial statements, times
the probability (1-p) that there is no error given his
choice H, times the probability (1-w) that the test B2
does not reveal a material error given that there is not
one.
To sum up, the auditee's total expected cost equals
Dh + vpDNQE + (l-v)pDNQE + w(1-p) Dnqne + (1-w) (l-p)DNQNE.
This game is more easily analyzed in normal form.
Normal form
A normal (strategic) form representation of the game
consists of sets of possible strategies, one for auditor
and one for auditee, and the payoffs to auditor and
auditee for each combination of strategies. Their
strategies and their outcomes for a game are depicted as
a matrix. Each player must choose a strategy based
solely on the information in this matrix, with the goal
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of maximizing his welfare. An important feature of such
representation is that, even though the auditee and the
auditor may move sequentially in the game, they "play"
their strategies simultaneously. Since the outcome of
either choice depends partly on the choice made by the
other player; that is, both simultaneous choices
determine a joint outcome, the information about the
strategy of each player is crucial. The payoff matrix is
assumed to be common knowledge; that is, the auditor and
the auditee know all the payoffs of both players.
The available strategies of the auditee are simply L or
H. The possible strategies of the auditor, somewhat
complex due to the sequential nature of the game, are a
combination of A1 or A2, and B1 or B2, and of his action Q
or NQ. The auditor strategy notation differs according
to whether he uses test A2 or A1. If he selects the test
A2 he does not care about the auditee's strategy. He is
interested in one of the tests B1 or B2. His strategy
notation is s followed by the number 1 or 2 showing which
either test B1 or test B2 and the capital letter
representing his action, e.g. , s2z. If he selects test
A1, he minds the auditee's strategy. His strategy
notation is s followed by two choices of the number 1 or
2 and the capital letter representing his choice for each
possible auditee's strategy, e.g., s2z2z.
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Table 9 Normal form
H L
S [Auditor payoff, [Auditor payoff,
Auditee payoff] Auditee payoff]
s?7 A?: B,: NQ,NQ [vpCN° + (l-v)pCN° [vqCN° + (l-v)qCN°
+ w(1-p)c ne + (i" + w(l-<3) ne + (1-
W) (1-p)C E , w)(l-q)C NE ,
Dh + vpD E + (1- vqDNQE + (l-v)qDNQE
v)pDNQE + w(l- + w(1-q) Dnqne + (1-
p)DMQNE + (1-w) (1- w) (1-q) Dnqne ]
P)DNQNE 3
s2z2z H/ B2• NQ,NQ [CA1 + vpnCNQE + (1- [CA1 + vqnCNQE + (1-
L, : NQ,NQ v)pnCNQE + w(l- v) qnCNQE + w( l-
p)c;> + q)c!> + (i-w)d-
P)C me ' q) c me /
Dh + vpDNQE + (1- vqDNQE + (1-v) qDNQE
v)pDNQE + w(l- + w(1-q) Dnqne + (1-
p)DNQNE + (1-w) (1- w) (1-q) Dnqne ]
P)dN°ne 3
Table 9 shows the strategies s2z and s2z2z in the normal
form and their payoff. The auditor's strategy labelled
s2z means that the auditor has chosen the test A2, which
does not reveal the auditee's strategy, he has chosen
test B2, the least fierce detection test, and he does not
qualify, no matter whether a material error is found or
not. The auditor's strategy labelled s2z2z means that the
auditor has chosen the test A.,, which reveals the
auditee's strategy, he has chosen test B2, the least
fierce detection test, and he does not qualify no matter
whether a material error is found or not. The outcome
for each auditee's strategy (H and L) combined to the
auditor's strategy is under the expected payoff.
74
Appendix 1 (page 200) shows the seventy-two auditor
strategies and two auditee strategies and their joint
outcome (one hundred and forty-four) of the payoff
matrix.
It should be remembered that if the auditor chooses,
e.g., s2z, not to know the auditee's strategy, the outcome
(qualified, non-qualified) cannot be contingent on the
auditee's choice, L or H, since the auditor does not know
that choice.
Objective function
The objective function is formulated as one to minimize
the expected payoff which is consistent with Beck and
Jung (1989); Fellingham and Newman (1985); Fellingham,
Newman and Patterson (1989); and Newman and Noel (1989).
To analyze this game a solution is needed.
Solution
The "solution" upon which the auditee and the auditor
will agree in a cooperative game is the set of strategies
which minimizes the sum of the auditee and the auditor
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payoff. Antle (1984) says that the "[c]ooperative
equilibrium concepts assume that the players can make
binding commitments before the game is played." (p.6).
Therefore, the auditee and the auditor form a coalition;
that is, they act as a one player and play a combined
agreed set of strategies with the aim of maximizing the
total payoff? that is, minimizing the total cost of the
game.
The solution concept of this cooperative game adapts the
n-person cooperative solution concept in game theory to
its aim of minimizing the total cost of the cooperative
game. This solution uses a characteristic function n1/n.
Thomas (1984) defines it as follow;
"The characteristic function of an n-person
game assigns to each subset S of the players
the maximum value /V(S) that coalition S can
guarantee itself by coordinating the strategies
of its members, no matter what the other
players do." (p.82).
The reason for choosing the n-person game approach (even
though n is only two), rather than the two person non¬
zero sum game bargaining solution based on the Nash
bargaining solution approach, is that in the
auditee/auditor game there are side payments in that the
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auditee pays the auditor a fee. The n-person game
assumes this is the case and so the solution splits into
two parts: 1) which coalitions will form and how will the
members of the coalition play the game so as to maximize
the reward of the coalition; and 2) how will the
coalition divide their reward among its members. The
bargaining solutions assume that there is no side payment
and so each player gets what the game gives him. Thus
the two stages described above are combined as the
players bargain over what to play and what their reward
will be at the same time.
In any essential two person game; that is, a coalition
providing a reward, it is clear that the coalition that
will form is the two players working together. An
essential game is a game it pays to form a coalition and
not only a game where the characteristic function value
is only additive; meaning there is no reward to work
together and each player is better off alone. So one is
interested in the characteristic function value of the
auditee and the auditor working together; that is, what
is the minimum combined cost (maximum reward) they can
ensure in this cooperative game working together. Thus
the characteristic function value of the coalition of
both of them is the minimization of combined costs, and
so we are interested in knowing what strategies give this
characteristic value.
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Note that we do not intend in this dissertation to look
at the subsequent problem of how the two parties share
out these costs; that is, what is the fee structure, as
our primary interest in the game is what are the actual
strategies the players will play, not what is their final
reward.
The "solution" in a non-cooperative game is quite
different. Consider a game involving two players; given
their motivation and complete information each wants to
choose an action which is best. Assume that whatever
action is ultimately chosen by the other, one's own
action should be a best response. To this point, each
player selects a single strategy with certainty. It may
be in the best interest of both parties to use randomized
strategies.
John Nash (1950) proved that an equilibrium point in
randomized strategies exists for every finite complete
information game, and this has subsequently been called
the Nash equilibrium (u,. (s,-*, s..*) >= u. (si, s.,-*) ) . Thus,
there will always exist at least one such solution,
although it does not need to be a pure one.
Equilibrium means a list of strategies (pure or
randomized), one for the auditee and one for the auditor,
with the property that no player would like unilaterally
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to change his strategy. In other words, for the auditee
(auditor), his strategy in the equilibrium is a best
response to the other's strategies in the equilibrium,
where "goodness" of strategy is determined by the
auditee's (auditor's) utility function. An equilibrium
point is an n-tuple of randomized strategies such that
each player's randomized strategy maximizes his payoff if
the strategies of the others are held fixed. Thus each
player's strategy is optimal against those of the other.
Randomized or mixed strategies are strategies in which
the player assigns a probability ps to the pure strategy
s5, where summation of pf equals one. For example, the
auditor may choose to play strategy s2z with probability
0.33 and s1x with probability 0.67; similarly, the
auditee may randomize over high and low level. Random
strategies are often observed in a real audit setting.
Auditee randomizes because he is oscillatory between two
pure equilibrium points, one which favours him, one the
auditor. This is some sort of "compromise solution",
which means equilibrium gets played occasionally
according to a random process. Many of the examples we
consider in the next section exhibit this characteristic.
One of the implications of an auditor playing randomized
strategies is to originate uncertainty about his
strategy's choice, not a dominant one, for the auditee.
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The latter in this situation may work harder.
All pure strategies are contained in the set of
randomized strategies. The pure strategy selected is
assigned a probability of one and all other strategies
are assigned a probability of zero.
The central concept of non-cooperative game theory - the
equilibrium - is driven by the auditee's (auditor's)
intelligence. Only in the trivial cases, where the
auditee or auditor has a dominant mode of behaviour (that
is, a mode of behaviour which maximizes his expected
utility regardless of what the other does) can the
requirement of intelligence be relaxed. Although they
have preferences based on self interest, none of them has
a dominant mode of behaviour within this setting.
The Nash equilibrium is an appealing solution concept for
non-cooperative games for two reasons: first, because
being best responses to the best responses of the others,
they are inherently stable points once reached; that is,
no one has any incentive to deviate (stability); and
second, players can discover the stable points merely by
reflecting on what their best responses are to the
other's best response strategies (feasibility). It is a
prediction about how the rational and intelligent auditee
and auditor will compete.
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Hansen and Samuelson (1988) suggest that the Nash
equilibrium is self-enforcing the rational behaviour of
the players. Rubinstein (1990) suggests that:
"equilibrium points can be viewed in ways other
than as self-enforcing agreements. For
example, they can be viewed as a strategy n-
tuples with the property that if, for some
extraneous reason, they 'come to the fore' or
are suggested to the players, there will be no
tendency to move away from them.
Alternatively, they can be viewed as providing
only a necessary condition for a satisfactory
theory of non-cooperative games: if a theory is
to 'recommend' a specific strategy to each
player, then the n-tuple of the recommended
strategies must be in equilibrium", (p.105-106)
In some games the Nash equilibrium may involve a
deterministic choice. When the Nash equilibrium is such
that each player chooses a single deterministic action,
there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies. However,
given the payoffs, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
could not exist; but it can still exist as randomized
strategies.
A low-pooling equilibrium will exist when damages are so
large in relation to the audit benefit that the maximum
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damages (or the tools in hand) anticipated by the auditee
and/or auditor are insufficient to induce any auditee
and/or auditor to work hard.
Summary
As in any theoretical research, numerous assumptions are
made in constructing the model. We will now summarize a
few assumptions.
1. Many of the complexities of the relationship between
auditor and auditee are not considered in the following
analysis. The major simplification is the two-person
framework.
2. For expositional convenience both the auditee and
the auditor are risk-neutral, consistent with Fellingham
and Newman (1985); Fellingham, Newman and Patterson
(1989); and Beck and Jung (1989). Although neither
auditees nor auditors are homogeneous group, it is
assumed that members of both groups have similar
preferences concerning minimizing their costs. Note that
this assumption allows for disagreement concerning
"tactics", i.e., about the details of implementing an
agreement. Gaa (1990) reports that as long as
disagreements on the "details" are overshadowed by an
overarching desire to reach an agreement, no serious
difficulties arise.
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3. All players know the preferences and payoffs of
their opponents. The payoff matrix is therefore assumed
to be common knowledge; that is, the auditee and the
auditor know all the payoffs and society inducements of
both players.
4. All players agree on all model parameters and view
each other as rational.
5. The analysis has been restricted to settings in which
the auditee chooses between high or low level of care and
the auditor chooses between knowing the auditee's
strategy or not, using a powerful test or not, and
qualifying or non-qualifying the audit opinion. In more
realistic settings, the auditee can make different levels
of care at different costs; and the auditor can acquire
different "amounts" of information at different costs.
Many of these simplifying assumptions have been
investigated by game theorists. For example, Harsanyi
(1967, 1968a,1968b) has shown that lack of knowledge of
preferences or payoffs does not alter the basic
representation of a game.
The solution of these games depends on parameter values.
Examples of auditor-auditee game
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Shubik (1983) states that:
"when we model decision makers who are acting
as fiduciaries for assets owned by others, it
is generally a fair approximation to ascribe to
them monetary cardinal utilities." (p.101).
In practice, auditors are partners and auditees lose
money proportional to the firm losses. However, to get
around the difficulty and for the purpose of making
predictions about the outcome, the utility of each player
is assumed equal to his monetary cost (payoff); that is,
the preference of the two players is identical and risk-
neutral .
The illustration of the auditee/auditor game requires
specific parameters for the various costs and damages in
the payoff matrix, along with estimates of conditional
probabilities. The internal control system is set as
dependent internal control which is highly dependent on
the auditee level of care. Our estimate of specific
parameters are based on the Fellingham and Newman (1985)
pattern of estimate cost and some parameters are the
same. They use parameters figuring relative costs which
are not intended to be a faithful compilation of
realistic costs.
The specific parameter values of the various costs,
damages except CNQE and DNQE, and conditional probabilities
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other than the inducement "n" are of little importance to
the central theme of this study. The value of damages
Cnqe and Dnqe and the inducement "n" are varied to test the
sensitivity of the various solutions for both the
cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Auditee's parameters
The auditee has one cost: DH, and four different damages:
DQ DQ DNQ DNQ
e ' ne ' e ' ne "
The cost of taking care over the accounting information
at a high level is set as follows:
dh = 35
The Dh's cost is the one suggested in Fellingham and
Newman (1985).
It should be remembered that we assume that the auditee
expected relative damages are DNQNE<DQNE<DQE and that
Dn°ne<Dn°e. In this dissertation, following the Fellingham
and Newman (1985) approach, we set these values:
Dqe = 220, Dqne = 120, Dnqne = 10
The sensitivity of the game to values of DNQE above 10 is
investigated, where DNQE is taken to incorporate any
damages by society against the auditee for issuing
materially inaccurate statements. Consequently, damages
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for Dnqe set under or above the fixed parameters for DQE =
220 and DQNE = 120 allow DNQE to be both less or more than
those damages.
It should be emphasized that these costs and damages are
not intended to be a faithful compilation of realistic
costs, but, like Fellingham and Newman (1985), just
representative of costs.
Auditor's parameters
The auditor has two different costs: CA1 , CB1, and four
different damages: C°E , CQNE , CNQNE , CNQE .
The cost of conducting the audit work is set as follows:
CA1 = 5, CB1 = 3.
The CA1's cost is the one suggested in Fellingham and
Newman (1985).
It should be remembered that it is assumed that CN0E is
greater than C°NE which is greater than CaE which is
greater than CNQNE, and in the version of the game whose
properties are investigated in this dissertation the
following values are set:
Cqe = 20, Cqne = 40, Cnqne = 10.
The damages of C°E are those suggested in Fellingham and
Newman (1985) . CNQNE is not set to zero as reputation
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damages can still be incurred if the auditee has
subsequent financial difficulties or fraud is discovered.
The dissertation investigates the sensitivity of the game
to values of CNQE equal to and above 40. CNQE includes any
damages imposed by society when the auditor fails to
qualify a materially incorrect set of statements.
The main concerns for the auditor are mismatches between
the audit opinion and the condition of the financial
statements, with CNQE being the highest damages; that is,
a failure to qualify a material inaccuracy is the highest
damages of all.
It could be argued that the damages C°E should be
different in the cooperative game from the non-
cooperative one. The argument is that the reputation of
the auditor is more affected when he qualifies, and the
risk of loss of the auditee is higher in a non-
cooperative game than in a cooperative game. However, in
this dissertation, these costs are not varied for the
cooperative and non-cooperative versions of the game.
Probabilities
Aldersley (1989) cites Kinney who uses an example in
which the auditor believes that 400 of 1,000 audit
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clients have book values containing a material error.
This means that the probability of a material error is
.4. Fellingham and Newman (1985) set the probability of
a material error being left in the financial statements
at five percent (r = .05) when the auditee works hard
and, like Kinney, at forty percent (q = .40) otherwise,
in their second example. Our examples do not use forty
percent (q = .40) as a benchmark. In our examples, the
Fellingham and Newman (1985) probabilities eliminate at
least one strategy, although it is there at "q" slightly
lower or higher than 0.40. Consequently, we set q = 0.25
that is at less than Kinney and Fellingham and Newman
(1985) suggestion.
In the version of the game whose properties are
investigated the probabilities are set as follows:
p = .05, q = .35, r = .95, t = .10, v = .80, and w = .25
The sensitivity of the model to these parameters is not
reported in this paper which investigates the sensitivity
to different damages imposed by society. Fellingham and
Newman (1985) investigate the game's sensitivity to p and
q.
Assuming it is social policy to promote certain behaviour
patterns for both auditee and auditor, the next chapter
88
presents an example of the cooperative game and then the




The idea of looking at the cooperative game in audit is
not a new one. Demski and Swieringa (1974) argued that
"the auditor and auditee do communicate and do enter into
mutually agreed upon arrangements. Hence, we shall focus
on a cooperative analysis." (p.509). They also said,
"the auditor and auditee jointly share in the
consequences they jointly produce; and they coordinate
these choices to the extent of, other things being equal,
not compromising each other." (p.510). They formulate a
cooperative environment in audit viewed as a Bayesian
decision problem maximizing subjective expected utility
for the auditee and the auditor. They conclude that some
problems identified strictly from the auditor's viewpoint
may not be optimal.
Rubinstein (1990) writes that: "the cooperative theory
requires communication as well as commitment and
contracting power; and it is a priori concerned with all
feasible outcomes." (p.106). Fellingham, Newman, and
Patterson (1989) define a cooperative game as: "(1) games
with strictly identical interests (commitments are
unnecessary) and (2) games with mixed interests and
enforceable agreements." (p.4). The incentives to
cooperate rely on all actors accepting and playing the
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game. They act together, with a common purpose, and
believe it is better to do so. They know how to interact
and how people perceive their action.
They form a coalition where both the auditee and the
auditor work together. We are therefore interested in
the characteristic function value of the auditee and the
auditor which minimizes the combined cost they can ensure
by working together, and in what are the strategies given
by the payoff of this characteristic function value. As
long as the auditee and the auditor keep their agreement
in the repeated games, they can share the maximum
expected reward (payoff).
They contract between them, commit, and, ideally, make
visible their cooperation. Some self-enforcing collusive
arrangement might be sought, perhaps at the expense of
third parties. Antle (1982) suggests an example where
the auditee and the auditor conspire to disadvantage the
owners.
Given the closeness of relations between auditees and
auditors, which makes cooperation feasible, and the
intense market pressures to reduce audit fees, it could
be suggested that the current audit environment is one
which promotes cooperation to keep down the expected
total costs of the audit; indeed, it is arguable that
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the implication of the lower total payoffs for the
cooperative version of the game is that cooperation
between auditee and auditor should be encouraged as a
matter of social policy. Therefore, it is assumed that
the auditee and the auditor have a 1:1 valuation on the
transfer of money, and that they will cooperate to
minimize the combined expected payoff from the game.
Our cooperative game illustration of the influence of
cost on the strategic choice of auditee/auditor does not
address the question of whether it is the auditee or the
auditor who should pay the damages. Our premise is that
society is interested in the effect of damages policy on
the auditee/auditor and not in the bargaining between the
two players.
Possible policy objectives considered are: (1) to induce
the auditee to make high effort; (2) to induce the
auditor to select a qualification outcome dependent on
the result of a test signalling whether there is a
material error; (3) to induce the auditor to employ a
test revealing the auditee's strategy; and (4) to induce
the auditee to make high effort and induce the auditor to
employ the test revealing the auditee's strategy, and a
qualification outcome dependent on the result of the test
signalling whether there is a material error. We will
discuss the implications of these alternatives for each
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variant of seven different "patterns"; and the
implications of each of these alternatives for the
overall seven different "patterns" revealed by the
cooperative game.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
In the next section, the meaning of a "pattern" is
defined, how to select the combined strategies is
explained, and the pattern building is illustrated. In
the following sections, the analysis of seven different
patterns and the overall patterns are presented. The
conclusion is contained in the final section.
Meaning and building of pattern
A pattern shows a picture (e.g., pattern one, Figure 5,
page 103) of the spaces occupied by the same combined
strategies in response to the effects of three variables.
First variable is the amount of damages for the auditor
associated with the combination of non-qualified opinion
and materially inaccurate statements, CNQE, and this lies
on the x axis. Second variable is the amount of damages
for the auditee associated with the combination of non¬
qualified opinion and materially inaccurate statements,
Dnqe, and this lies on the Y axis. Lastly, there is "n",
which is the range of inducement for the auditor to use
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test A,, in order to reveal the auditee strategy. The
value of "n" is shown at the centre of the top of the
picture. The effect of varying "n" affects only the
variable CNQE (X axis) . Let us look at how to choose the
combined strategy.
Choice of the combined strategies
It should be remembered that the cooperative solution
uses a characteristic function nt/n. The latter assigns
a minimum payoff (cost) to each coalition of the auditee
and the auditor. We are interested in the coordinated
strategies having the coalition's minimum payoff of the
game. Within our game, the identification of the minimum
payoff is relatively easy because the auditee has only
two strategies. Appendix A.2 (page 215) shows the
payoffs of the possible strategies within a society
damages regime with the following parameters
investigated: CNQE = 40, DNQE = 10 and n = 1.00.
For example, the payoff of the auditor's strategy S1K and
of the auditee's strategy H is 42.00 and 160.00 (page
215, Table 1.1 under "H Auditor" and "H Auditee"). The
coalition payoff, named subsequently combined payoff,
which is the sum of the auditor's and auditee's payoff,
is 202.00; that is, 42.00 + 160.00 (under "H Coop").
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Different extensions of Table from .1 to .5 are used,
according to different auditor choices of tests. For
example, the extension .1 refers to auditor's choice of
test A2; and extensions .2 to .5 refer to his choice of
test A,.
The minimum combined auditee's and auditor's payoff for
each coalition of each Table's extension (.1, .2, .3, .4,
.5) is summarized at the top of page 215 under "Coop H"
and "Coop L". The minimum payoff of all the coalition
appears at the line "MINIMUM". It indicates in which
extension of table to find the combined strategies having
the coalition's minimum payoff of the game.
For example, the minimum combined payoff is 30.50 under
"Coop L" (the right column). This number is also in line
with Table .l's extension. We look at Table 1.1 under "L
Coop" and find 30.50, which is the sum of the auditor's
payoff, 20.50, (under "L Auditor" column) and the
auditee's payoff, 10.00, (under "L Auditee" column). It
indicates the auditor's strategy S2Z connected with the
auditee's strategy.L; and the combined strategy is named
To find the space's limits of the combined strategy, we
change the auditor amount of damages on x axis until the
actual combined strategy shifts to another combined
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strategy.
Appendix A. 3 (page 220) shows the combined payoff for CN0E
= 126 in Table 2 and for CNQE = 127 in Table 3. For
example, in Table 2.1, the auditor's damages on the x
axis, is 60.60. The latter points out the combined
strategy L^, the same as in Table 1.1 (see appendix A.2,
page 215). However, in Table 3.1, the auditor's damages
on the x axis (CNQE = 127) is 60.85, which points out the
combined strategy H2Z. We do the same process for the
auditee's damages on the y axis and we get the limits of
this combined strategy. Let us look at pattern one as an
illustration of pattern building.
Building pattern one
The "solution" upon which the auditee and the auditor
agree in a cooperative game is the combined strategy that
minimizes the sum of the auditee and the auditor costs.
The first depiction sets n = 1.00, meaning society does
not recognize the auditor's effort when he has employed
test A1 which reveals to him the auditee strategy.
Table 10 shows the combined strategies in a cooperative
game for different damages (CNQE, DNQE) .
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Table 10 Cooperative game n = 1.00
n = 1.00
Space intercepts
Combined Auditor Auditee Expected
Strategy CNQE DNQE pay-offs
*
1
f >42,512 >42,482 188.00
H1X 574«42, 512 544«42 , 482 83.16 - 187.99
H2Z 127«574 97«544 60.85 - 83.15
Lzz 4 0«127 10«97 30.50 - 60.60
The letter "n" (n = 1.00) indicates no inducement if the
auditor chooses test A1. The identification of the
combined strategy within the range of damages is
displayed under "Combined Strategy". The numbers under
"Auditor CNQE" (>42,512) and under "Auditee DNQE" (>42,482)
indicate respectively the range of the auditor and
auditee damages. The number(s) under "Expected Payoff"
(188.00) represent the sum (or range) of expected costs
associated with the range of damages for the auditee and
the auditor and the other fixed variables. The maximum
amount of damages uses in the examples for CNQE or DNQE is
damages equal to 999,999.
Figure 2 shows schematically (not to scale) the combined
strategies within the auditee and the auditor damages









Figure 2 Cooperative game n = 1.00
society imposes damages to the auditor and auditee such
that Cnqe and DNQE are within space 3 of Figure 2, then the
solution to the game is the strategy (H1x) .
We will now explain the notation used for the combined
strategy. The capital letters L and H mean respectively
Low level and High level of care taken by the auditee in
respect to the accounting information. A subscript to
capital letter L or H could be without or with a dash (—
) and refers to the auditor's choice between tests A2 and
A1. The absence of a dash, as in our example (H1X, space
3, Figure 2), means the auditor has chosen A2. A dash
within the subscript (e.g., Hlx__, space 3.1, Figure 6,
page 109) means the auditor has chosen A1. The place of a
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dash within the subscript also indicates the auditee
strategy, as do the capital letters L and H. If the dash
comes first, it means the auditee has chosen L (low level
of care). If the dash comes last, it means the auditee
has chosen H (high level of care). The subscript number
and subscript capital letter indicate respectively the
auditor choice between tests B and his action.
The subscript number itself refers to the auditor's
choice between tests B1 and B2. The subscript digit "1"
(H1X) means the auditor has chosen test B,, and the
subscript digit "2" means he has chosen B2. The subscript
capital letter refers to the auditor's action: K = Q,Q;
X = Q,NQ; Y = NQ,Q; and Z = NQ,NQ.
For example, if society and/or a regulator impose damages
against the auditee and the auditor such that DNQE and CNQE
fall within space 3 of Figure 2, then the solution in the
game as shown in Table 10 is the combined strategy H1x.
The H means the auditee has chosen High level of care;
the absence of a dash means the auditor has chosen A2 and
therefore he does not know that the auditee's strategy
has been carried out; the subscript digit "1" shows he
has chosen the extended test B1; and the subscript
capital letter "X" (Q,NQ) indicates he qualifies the
audit opinion if test B1 signals a material error;
otherwise, he does not qualify. To sum up, the auditee
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strategy H is connected with the auditor strategy s1x
(A2, B1:Q, NQ) and we label it H1x.
The calculation uses for the expected payoff is now
explained. For example, the calculation of the expected
payoff for H1x in Table 10 is the sum of the auditee and
the auditor costs and damages along with the
probabilities, as follows:
{ [CB1 + rPCQE + (1-r) pCNQE + t (1-p) C°NE + (l-t)(l-
P)Cnone ] + [DH + rpDQE + (l-r)pDNQE + t(l-p)DQNE +
(1-t) (l-p)DNQNE ]}.
Agreeing with the number given to the fixed numerical
variables and CNQE = 574, DNQE = 10, and n = 1.00 the
expected payoff is:
{[3 + (0.95)(0.05)(20) + (0.05)(0.05)(574) +
(0.10)(0.95)(40) + (0.90)(0.95)(10)] + [35 +
(0.95) (0.05) (220) + (0.05) (0.05) (10) +
(0.10)(0.95)(120) + (0.90)(0.95)(10)]} = 83.16
which is the minimum expected payoff of the range 83.16-
187.99 (see Table 10, page 96).
Figure 3 shows the damages and their combined strategies








Figure 3 Symmetry in cooperative game
that the auditee and the auditor are assumed to have a
1:1 valuation on the transfer of money. Figure 3
pinpoints this symmetry (e.g., 87 is an intercept on both
axes) when "n" does not influence the combined strategy.
Figure 2 (page 97) shows the same selection but starting
from (40,10) which are the minimum damages associated
with an audit for the illustration used within this
dissertation.
"n" is now changed from n = 1.00 to examine the effect on
the pattern of changing "n". The end of the pattern
happens at n = 0.96. Table 11 shows the combined
strategies according to different damages for n = 0.96.
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Table 11 Cooperative game n = 0.96
n = 0.96
Space intercepts
Combined Auditor Auditee Expected
Strategy CNQE DN0E pay-offs
>42,512 >42,482 188.00
H1X 574«42,512 544«42,482 83.16 - 187.99
H2z 127«574 97«544 60.85 - 83. 15
L>22 4 0«127 10«97 30.50 - 60.60
Note that Table 10 and Table 11 are identical, except for
the inducement "n". Also note that Figure 4 shows an
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H1X 574«42 , 512 544«42 , 482 83.16 - 187.99
H2Z 127«574 97«544 60.85 - 83.15
hZZ 4 0«127 10«97 30.50 - 60.60
identical pattern of strategies to Figure 2. In the
range n = 1.00 to n = 0.96, the auditee and the auditor
stick to the same strategies. Given that, Table 12 and
Figure 5 show the result for the range n = 1.00 to n =
0.96. The other patterns are built in the same way.
Figure 5 shows schematically the strategies's space
representing the pattern one for the range n = 1.00 to n
= 0.96 and the relative damages commanding these
strategies.
Pattern One
Table 12 and Figure 5 show that if society, through a
regulator and/or court, imposes relative damages against
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the auditee greater than 42,482 and the auditor greater
than 42,512, then the auditee and the auditor choose the
space identified 1 in Figure 5.
The combined strategy in space 1, L2|C, means that the
auditee takes Low care, and that by choosing A2 and B2,
the auditor does not incur extra direct costs. The
auditor gualifies if B2 signals a material error and also
qualifies if B2 does not signal a material error. In
other words, his audit opinion is unconcerned with the
result of the audit work within this space. The greatest
amount of damages result in minimal required auditee care
and minimum audit procedures. Both players, responding
to this knowledge, choose a low level of effort since
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effort is costly and produces minimal benefit in terms of
damages. The highest damages level suggests that the
auditee and the auditor give up in terms of effort.
The space identified 3 (H1x) suggests that both the
auditee and the auditor agree to higher effort and cost.
The auditor chooses the extended test B1 and his audit
opinion relies on the test's signal. At the same time,
the auditee works hard. Their efforts reduce the
probability of material error being left in the financial
statements.
The space identified 4 (H2Z) suggests that only the
auditee agrees to higher effort and cost. His effort
reduces the probability of material error, although the
auditor is still indifferent to the result of the audit
work.
The space identified 6 (L^) suggests that the auditee and
the auditor agree to minimum effort. The auditee has
chosen low level of care over the accounting system and
the auditor does not qualify the audit report, no matter
if a material error is found or not.
As shown in Figure 5 and Table 13, the auditee agrees to
high level of care in spaces 3 and 4. This implies that
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Table 13 Auditee strategies choices
1.00 >= n >= 0.96
Damages adopted Figure Auditee's Auditee's
by society space strategy effort





society could influence the auditee behaviour using
different levels of damages and, although there is a need
for damages, too high a level of damages (space 1 in
Figure 5) is counterproductive.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3 and 4 (H1x and H2Z) for the
selection of damages associated with a non-qualified
opinion (NQ) when the state of accounting information is
in error (E) . A choice of damages from space 4 (H2Z)
where the auditor does not qualify no matter if a
material error is found or not, implies that society
perceives the function of the audit as being not to find
material error, but rather to induce the auditee to make
higher effort and thus reduce the likelihood of material
error.
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Table 14 Pattern One: Auditor strategies choices









> 42,512 1 A2, B2: Q, Q




The auditee strategic choices in Table 13 maintain the
same basic pattern through the illustration of the
cooperative game. Thus the above analysis, related
strictly to the auditee's behaviour, applies through all
the cooperative game patterns.
As shown in Figure 5 and Table 14, the auditor's effort
for the range n = 1.00 to n = 0.96 is B1, and therefore
his audit opinion is qualified if test B1 signals a
material error; otherwise, is non-qualified. As regards
to auditor high effort, none of the auditor's strategies
(Table 14) corresponding to all spaces in Figure 5
include test A1 which reveals the auditee's strategy;
hence the most rigorous audit work is in space 3 (H1x)
which includes the extended test B,.
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Consequently, the inducement must be greater; meaning
that "n" must be less than 0.96 to convince the auditor
to choose test A1. Mathematically, the reduction of
damages to the percentage n = 0.96 payable on the total
damages otherwise suffered by the auditor does not cover
the fixed fees CA1 in any space within this pattern.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B1 by the auditor, then this implies the adoption
of space 3 (H1x) for the selection of damages associated
with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when the state of
accounting information is in error (E).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and qualification
outcome dependent on the result of test B1, then it is
looking ideally for the parties to adopt the space 3 (H1X)
for the selection of damages associated with a non¬
qualified opinion (NQ) when the state of accounting
information is in error (E).
The essential features of pattern one are:
1) society could influence the auditor's as well as the
auditee's behaviour by adopting levels of damages towards
the audit when there is non-qualification but material
error;
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2) commitments by the auditee to take a particular
strategy when the auditor selects A2 cannot be enforced
because the auditee's strategy cannot be observed;
3) the audit opinion (qualified/non-qualified) cannot be
contingent on the auditee's choice, since the auditor
does not know (he does not play A1) that choice.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 1.00 to 0.96 (pattern one) to 0.95 to 0.89 (pattern
two) .
Pattern Two
As previously stated in pattern one, none of the auditor
strategies includes test A1, the test which reveals to the
auditor the auditee strategy. To encourage the inclusion
of test A1 (qualitative test) in the auditor's strategy,
it is necessary to offer an incentive in the form of a
percentage less than 0.96 (n < 0.96) payable on the total
damages otherwise suffered by the auditor in the event of
a failure to qualify a materially inaccurate set of
financial statements.
Figure 6 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.95 to 0.89. The only
change in Figure 6 from Figure 5 (page 103) happens in
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space 3 (H1X) . There is one new space and that is 3.1.
This space is an extension of space 3. It has the same
strategy root H1X. The other spaces are identical to
pattern one.
The strategy of space 3.1 (H1x__) suggests that the auditor
agrees to employ tests A1 and B1. We must remember that
the presence of a dash within a subscript means the
auditor has chosen A1. The auditor performs the most
rigorous audit, which includes observation of the auditee
strategy (A1) and the extended test (B.,), and his audit
opinion relies on his observation of commitments by the
auditee and the test's signal. Hence the fixed fee of
test A1, CA1 has been covered at the starting range n =
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0.95.
To calculate the damages limit, CNQE, the cost of H1x is
set equal to H1X.. and by elimination we obtain:
(1-r) pCNQE = CA1 + (1-r) pnCNQE (1)
and the lower limit is obtained by isolating CA1 from the
equation (1) and solving for CNQE:
Cnqe = CA1/(l-n) (l-r)p (2)
and the upper limit, as shown in Figure 3 for n = 1.00,
must equal 42,512, the maximum damages before the auditor
gives up and qualifies no matter if a material error is
found or not. So putting 42,512 in equation (1), we
obtain:
(1~r) p (42 , 512) = CA1 + (l-r)pnCN0E (3)
isolating nCNQE from the equation (3) and solving for CNQE:
Cnqe = {[(42,512) - CA1/(l-r)p]/n) (4)
For example, in Figure 6, for n = 0.95, CA1 = 5, p = 0.05
and r = 0.95, the lower limit is 5/(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) =
40,000; and the upper is {[42,512 -
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5/(0.05) (0.05) ]/(0.95) } = 42,644.
Table 15 Pattern Two: Auditor strategies choices











1 A2, B2 • Q, Q
40,000-42,644;
18,182-45,519
3.1 Ai, B1" Q, NQ A1 and B,
574-40,000;
574-18,182
3 A2, B1 • Q, NQ B1
40-574 4 and A2,B2:NQ,NQ
6
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 15, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, and B1. As regards the auditor's
highest effort, one of his strategies corresponding to
space 3.1 (H1X__) in Figure 6 includes the test revealing
the auditee' s strategy A1 and the extended test B1 ; hence
the most rigorous audit work is within that space.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, then this implies
the adoption of space 3.1 (H1x..) for the selection of
damages associated with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when
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the state of accounting information is in error (E).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditee and selection of
test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B1, then it is looking ideally for the adoption of
the space 3.1 (H1X__) .
The essential feature of pattern two is that society
could influence the auditor in such a way that he employs
the test A1 which reveals the auditee's strategy and
confines his audit opinion to the signal from the
extended test B1.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 0.95 to 0.89 (pattern two) to 0.88 to 0.83 (pattern
three).
Pattern Three
Figure 7 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.88 to n = 0.83. The only
change in Figure 7 from Figure 6 happens in space 6 (L^) .
There is one new space that is 6.1. This space is an
extension from space 6. The strategy of space 6.1 has
the same root (L^) as space 6. The other spaces are
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identical to pattern two.
The strategy of space 6.1 (L._2Z) indicates that the
auditor agrees to employ test A1 which reveals to him the
auditee strategy. He plays test A1 purely to observe the
auditee's strategy by getting a lower percentage (n) on
the total damages that would otherwise be incurred, since
commitment by the auditee to choose low level of care is
the worst possibility that a material error could occur
and the auditor does not qualify no matter if a material
error is found or not.
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Table 16 Pattern Three: Auditor strategies choices











1 a2 / b2: q, q
16,667-46,036;
11,765-48,810
3.1 ai, : q, nq A1 and b1
574-16,667;
574-11,765
3 a2, : q, nq B1







As shown in Figure 7 and Table 16, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, B1, and A1. As regards the
auditor's highest effort, one of his strategies
(Table 16) corresponding to space 3.1 (H1X__) in Figure 7
includes the test revealing the auditee' s strategy (A.,)
and the extended test (B1) ; hence the most rigorous audit
work is within that space.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, then this implies
the adoption of space 3.1 (H1x__) and 6.1 (L__2Z) . But a
choice of damages from space 6.1 where the auditee has
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chosen low level of care and the auditor employs the test
A1 only to get a lower "n" and does not qualify no matter
if a material error is found or not, implies that society
perceives the function of the audit as being not to find
material error but to reveal the auditee strategy.
Therefore, the auditor is playing the system; that is, he
is getting the benefit of playing test A1 but not
performing to the spirit.
The essential feature of pattern three within space 6.1
implies that the choice of this level of society's
inducement is not worth it for society; as it benefits
only the auditor who performs test A1.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 0.88 to 0.83 (pattern three) to 0.82 to 0.65
(pattern four).
Pattern Four
Figure 8 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.82 to n = 0.65. The only
change in Figure 8 from Figure 7 page 114 happens in
space 4 (H2Z) . There is one new space that is 4.1. This
space is an extension from space 4. It has the same
strategy root H2Z. The other spaces are identical to
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pattern three.
The strategy of space 4.1 (H2Z__) indicates that the
auditor agrees to employ test A1 which reveals the
auditee's strategy. Although he looks at the auditee's
strategy in that space, his audit opinion, as in pattern
three, is indifferent to the results of the audit work.
As shown in Figure 8 and Table 17, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, B1, and A1. As regards the
auditor's highest effort, one of the auditor's strategies
(Table 17) corresponding to space 3.1 includes the test
revealing the auditee's strategy A1 and the extended test
B1; hence the most rigorous audit work is within that
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Table 17 Pattern Four: Auditor strategies choices
0.82 >= n >= 0.65
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort
> 49,405;
63,226
1 a2, b2 : Q, Q
11,111-49,405;
5,714-62,326
3.1 a1' B1 : q,nq a1 and b.
578-11,111;
729-5,714














If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3.1 (H1X__) , 4.1 (H2Z__) and 6.1 (L__
2Z) . A choice of damages from space 4.1 where the auditor
does not qualify no matter if a material error is found
or not, implies that society perceives the function of
the audit as being not to find material error but rather
to enforce commitment by the auditee to choose high level
of care and thus reduce the likelihood of material error.
But the auditor in these spaces, except space 3.1, plays
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test A1 only to reveal the auditee's strategy by earning a
lower percentage offered on CNQE.
The essential feature of pattern four within space 4.1 is
that society may influence the auditor to employ test A1
to induce the auditee to select high effort.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 0.82 to 0.65 (pattern four) to 0.64 to 0.56 (pattern
five).
Pattern Five
Figure 9 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with n = 0.64 to n = 0.56. The only change in
Figure 9 from Figure 8 happens in space 6.1 (L..2Z) . There
is one less space and that space is space 6. The other
spaces are identical to pattern four.
The elimination of space 6 (Lj,) suggests that the auditor
employs test A1 which reveals to him the auditee strategy
within the space. Although he looks at the auditee
strategy in that space, his audit opinion, as in pattern
three, is indifferent to the results of the audit work.
Nor is test A1 being played to induce high effort as in
pattern four. In this space, test A1 is being played to
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observe the auditee's strategy.
As shown in Figure 9 and Table 18, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, B1, and A1. As regards the
auditor's highest effort, one of the auditor's strategies
(Table 18) corresponding to space 3.1 in Figure 9
includes the test revealing the auditee's strategy A1 and
the extended test B1; hence the most rigorous audit work
is within that space.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3.1 (H1X__) , 4.1 (H2Z._) and 6.1 (L._
22) •
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Table 18 Pattern Five: Auditor strategies choices
0.64 >= n >= 0.56
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort
> 63,300;
72,343
1 A2, B2: Q, Q
5,556-63,300;
4,545-72,343
3.1 Ai, B1" Q, NQ A1 and B.
741-5,556; 872-
4,545
3 A2, B1: Q, NQ Bi
190-278; 227-
228








An essential feature of pattern five within space 6.1 (L__
22) is that the result of society inducement is not
necessarily perfect since after the information has been
revealed the auditor may prefer to cancel any audit work
to avoid auditing cost. If society, however, recognizes
that the auditing effort may not be done or be worth
while in that space, it should not agree to any
inducement effects of test A, within that space.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"




Figure 10 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with n = 0.55 to n = 0.23. The only change in
Figure 10 from Figure 9 happens to the placement of space
4.1 (H2z__) . The implication is that certain strategic
choices cannot be induced by damages on the auditor
alone; hence, space 4 (H2Z) does not lie on the x axis.
The other spaces are identical to pattern five.
The strategy of space 4.1 (H2Z__) suggests that the auditor
employs test A1 which reveals to him the auditee strategy
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within the space. Although he looks at the auditee
strategy in that space, his audit opinion, as in pattern
four, is indifferent to the results of the audit work and
he plays test A1 only to reveal the auditee's strategy by
earning a lower percentage offered on CNQE.
Table 19 Pattern Six: Auditor strategies choices
0.55 >= n >= 0.23
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's












3.1 a1, B1: Q,nq a, and B.
890-4,444;
2,470-2,597






a1, B2: nq,nq A1
As shown in Figure 10 and Table 19, the auditor's efforts
are A1 and B1, B1 and A1. As regards the auditor's highest
effort, one of the four auditor's strategies
corresponding to space 3.1 in Figure 10 includes the test
revealing the auditee's strategy A1 and the extended test
B1; hence the most rigorous audit work is within that
space.
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If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3.1 (H1X._) , 4.1 (H2Z__) and 6.1 (L__
2Z) •
The essential features of pattern six is that, in certain
strategic choices, space 4 (H2Z) can not be induced by
damages on the auditor alone and within space 4.1 (H2Z__)
this level of society inducement does not influence the
audit opinion, but does induce the auditee to high
effort. The inducement is not necessarily perfect since
after the information has been revealed the qualification
outcome is independent from the result of test B and the
auditor may prefer to cancel any extra audit work to
avoid auditing cost. If society, however, recognizes
that the test A1 may influence the auditee to choose high
effort, the inducement effects of test A1 in space 4.1
could be worthwhile.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 0.55 to 0.23 (pattern six) to "n" less than 0.23
(pattern seven).
Pattern Seven
Figure 11 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
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associated with "n" less than 0.23. From n <= 0.22, the
auditor has agreed to select test A, within all spaces
except space 1 (I^) • Figure 12 shows schematically the
pattern of strategies associated with "n" equal to 0.01,
the greatest inducement before society gives up any
damages in cases where the auditor plays A1.
The only change in Figure 11 and Figure 12 from Figure 10
happens in space 3.1 (H1X__) . Space 3 is removed from the
x axis. The other spaces are identical to pattern six.
The implication is that in certain strategic choices,
space 4 (H2z) and 3 (H1x) , cannot be induced by damages on
the auditor alone.
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Space 3.1 on the x axis is only represented by H1X__. On
the x axis the auditor employs test A, which reveals to
him the auditee strategy within all spaces but space 1
(L^). However, he looks at the auditee strategy in space
3.1 (H1X__) , his audit opinion is dependent on the results
of the audit work.
As shown in Figure 11, Figure 12 and Table 20, the
auditor's high efforts are A1 and B1, and B1. As regards
the auditor's highest effort, one of the three auditor's
strategies (Table 20) corresponding to space 3.1 in
Figure 11 includes the test revealing the auditee's
strategy A1 and the extended test B1; hence the most
rigorous audit work is within that space.
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Table 2 0 Pattern Seven: Auditor strategies choices















3.1 A1, B1: Q, NQ A1 and B.
40-2,606; 40-
57,330
6.1 A1, B2: NQ, NQ A,
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditee to make high effort and selection
of test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the
result of test B1 by the auditor, then it is looking
ideally for the adoption of the space 3.1 (H1X__) .
The essential feature of pattern seven is that society
could encourage the auditor to employ test A1 and know the
auditee's strategy through all spaces except space 1 (L^)
with n = 0.22 or less by imposing damages on the auditor.
Summary
The following sums up the possible attitudes of society
towards the patterns chosen by the auditee and the auditor.
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If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3 (H1x) and 4 (H2Z) for the
selection of damages associated with a non-qualified
opinion (NQ) when the state of accounting information is
in error (E). The relative damages are approximately
identical through all the patterns.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B1 by the auditor, then this implies the adoption
of space 3 (H1x) . Note that this space is in all patterns
although from pattern seven it implies that society
cannot induce this strategic choice by damages on the
auditor alone.
It should be remembered that a choice of damages from
space 4 (H2Z) , where the auditor does not qualify no
matter if a material error is found or not, implies that
society perceives the function of the audit as being not
to find material error, but rather to induce higher
effort on the part of the auditee and thus reduce the
likelihood of material error.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages auditors to employ test A1, this implies the
adoption of space 3.1 (H1x__) starting from pattern Two,
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6.1 (L__22) starting from pattern Three, and 4.1 (H2Z__)
starting from pattern Four. However, a choice of damages
from space 4.1 and 6.1 where the auditor employs the test
A1 and does not qualify no matter if a material error is
found or not, implies that society's incentive may induce
the auditor to play test A,; that is, to reveal the
auditee strategy but to employ bad logic from there on.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditee to make high effort and selection
of test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the
result of test B1 then it is looking ideally for the
adoption of the space 3.1 (H1x__) starting from pattern
Two.
The essential feature of all the patterns is that society
could influence the auditee and the auditor behaviour by
selecting different damages.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored, through a cooperative game
theory of the audit, how the auditee's and the auditor's
strategic choices are influenced by damages imposed on
auditee and auditor for issuing a materially inaccurate
set of statements without a qualified audit opinion. It
129
is seen that these damages must be established within a
specific range of "n" and spaces, the choice of "n" and
spaces being dependent upon the policy objectives of
society.
Possible policy objectives considered are: (1) to induce
the auditee to make high effort; (2) to induce the
auditor to select a gualification outcome dependent on
the result of test B; (3) to induce the auditor to
employ test A1; and (4) to induce the auditee to make
high effort and induce the auditor to employ test A1, and
a gualification outcome dependent on the result of test B
through the behavioural effect of the audit.
In considering the policy objective (1), it may not be
necessary for the auditor to maximize effort. This
implies that society perceives the function of the audit
as being not necessarily to find material error, but
rather to induce higher effort on the part of the auditee
and thus reduce the likelihood of material error. It
could achieve this by promoting auditee relative damages
within spaces 3 and 4 of each pattern.
In considering the policy objective (2), society should
set auditor relative damages within space 3 (H1x) of
patterns except within pattern seven where it cannot be
induced by damages on the auditor only. This implies
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that society perceives the function of the audit as being
necessarily to find material error.
In considering the policy objective (3), society must
offer an inducement in the form of a proportion of the
damages suffered by the auditor in the event of a failure
to qualify a materially inaccurate set of statements.
This implies that society perceives the function of the
audit as being necessarily to reveal the auditee's
strategy (see space 3.1 (H1X__) , 4.1 (H2Z__) and 6.1 (L__2Z) ) ,
and induce high effort from the auditee within space 4.1
and 3.1. However, within space 4.1 and 6.1 the auditor
qualification outcome is independent of the result of
test A1 and society should not encourage this space.
The policy objective (4) which has been considered
combines the three first possible policy objectives.
This implies that society perceives the function of the
audit as being necessarily to induce higher effort on the
part of the auditee, to employ test A1 and qualification
outcome contingent on the result of test B, on the part of
the auditor. Only the space 3.1 (H1x__) starting from
pattern Two meets this audit function. Note that pattern
Two has an inducement of only 0.95 >= n >= 0.89, meaning
that society gives up only between five and eleven
percent of the total damages otherwise suffered by the
auditor in the event of a failure to qualify a materially
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inaccurate set of statements. A choice of this space and
"n" is the cheapest option for society to get high effort
from the auditee as well as the most rigorous audit.
The combination of the policy (1) and (2) let us know
that if society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and gualification
outcome dependent on the result of test B,, then it is
looking ideally for the parties to adopt the space 3
(H1x) . Note that this space is in all patterns and the
cheapest pattern in terms of inducement for society is
pattern One.
In this chapter the audit is modelled as a cooperative
game, and in the first pattern of this cooperative game
(1.00 >= n >= 0.96) there is an element of trust since
the auditor does not play test A1 to check that the
auditee is carrying out the agreed auditee strategy.
It is seen that society inducement "n" modifies firstly
space 3 (H1x, pattern two) , secondly space 6 (L^, pattern
three) , and thirdly space 4 (H2Z, pattern four) . Finally,
the inducement "n" extends fully the use of test A1
respectively to space 6.1 (pattern five), space 4.1
(pattern six), and finally 3.1 (pattern seven). Thus for
n = 0.22 or less, the auditor always chooses the test A,
which reveals the auditee's strategy, except for space
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one, assuming the inducement of damages is available for
the auditor alone.
It is also seen that the auditor performs an audit
opinion contingent on the signal of test B (space 3 and
3.1) only when he selects test B1. In all other spaces,
the auditor is indifferent to the test B result and
qualifies within space 1 and does not qualify in the
other spaces (4, 4.1, 6 and 6.1).
The patterns of this cooperative game show that under a
policy objective of maximising auditee and auditor
effort, setting the damages too high or too low results
in the auditee adopting a low level of care and the
auditor adopting a dominant strategy with the audit
opinion (qualified or non-qualified) being indifferent to
the results of the audit. There is a need for damages,
but extreme damages levels are counterproductive.




Rubinstein (1990) says, the "non-cooperative theory
requires that there be neither commitment nor contracting
power, but it permits communication; and it is concerned
with equilibrium outcomes." (p.106). Thus, non-
cooperative qames are games with strictly opposite
interests (zero-sum game) and games with mixed interests
without enforceable agreements. The crucial feature is
the inability to make a binding agreement; hence, each
player seeks a strategy to minimize his own expected cost
(payoff) based on the anticipated behaviour of the other
player. They would both prefer to cooperate if they
could, but their preferences, which differ from those
indicated in the last chapter, are such that it is
rational for them not to cooperate.
The interest in this illustration is in a non-cooperative
setting in which the auditee and the auditor have mixed
interests without enforceable agreements. This captures
the major elements of the standard external audit
settings, in which there are objectives of mutual
interest (e.g., uncovering of unintended accounting
error) and points of conflict (e.g., auditee's effort to
reduce reporting errors and auditor's divulgence of
auditee's strategy) between the auditee and the auditor.
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For example, Aldersley (1989) argues that the auditee's
view of materiality is substantially different from audit
materiality and auditees require much more extensive
procedures before even considering a correction.
Kinney (1988) cites Beaver and Demski who argue that
audited financial statements have two primary uses: one
is the pre-decision use of providing information about
the state of the firm, and the second is a post-decision
use of facilitating contracting with respect to the state
of the firm; in both cases, the statement's preparer
generally has a conflict of interest with the user.
The illustration of the influence of cost on the
strategic choice of auditor/auditee discusses the
implications of policy objectives presented in the
previous chapter (page 92, 130) for each variation of
four different "patterns" revealed by the non-cooperative
game. Implications of these alternatives are then
discussed for the overall four different "patterns".
Subsequently, two patterns of the previous chapter
(cooperative game) and two of this chapter (non-
cooperative game) are overlapped.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
in the next section, the meaning of "pattern" is defined
and its building is demonstrated; in the following
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sections, the four different and two overlapped patterns
are presented? the conclusion is contained in the final
section.
Meaning and building of pattern
As in the previous chapter, a pattern shows a picture
(e.g., pattern one, Figure 15, page 149) of the spaces
occupied by the same joint strategies in response to the
effects of three variables. The first variable is the
amount of damages for the auditor associated with the
combination of non-qualified opinion and materially
inaccurate statements, CNQE, and this lies on the x axis.
The second variable is the amount of damages for the
auditee associated with the combination of non-qualified
opinion and materially inaccurate statements, DN0E, and
this lies on the Y axis. Lastly, there is the range of
inducement for the auditor to employ test A1, "n", in
order to reveal the auditee strategy. The value of "n"
is shown at the centre of the top of the pattern. The
effect of varying "n" affects only the variable CNQE (x
axis). Let us look at how we choose the joint
strategies.
Choice of the joint strategies
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We use, as explained in the preceding chapter (page 94),
different extension numbers of Table from .1 to .5. The
joint strategies are obtained from the payoff values.
Appendix A.2 (page 215), shows the payoffs in the game
where CN0E = 40, DMQE = 10 and n = 1.00. Under the "Non-
Coop" title, the minimum payoff for the auditor for each
of his possible strategies is given when the auditee
plays H and then when the auditee plays L. The "MINIMUM"
line shows the auditor's minimum payoff of the game
against each of the auditee's strategy, and indicates
where to find it.
Nash's theorem tells us that there is always at least one
equilibrium pair in a finite game. In games with
minimizing objectives, like the ones considered here,
(x,y) is an equilibrium pair if e.,(x',y) => e.,(x,y), where
e1 (., .) is the auditor's payoff and e2(. , .) is the
auditee's payoff. Thomas (1984) specifies that if for
any y we find the x that minimizes e^Xjy) and, if that y
is part of an equilibrium pair, then we have found the x
that must be its partner.
For our game this implies that if (x*,H) is an equilibrium
pair, the x* must be the minimum of e.,(x,H); and if
(x*,L) is an equilibrium pair, e.,(x,L) must be minimized
at x*.
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For example, Appendix A.4 (page 223), shows the extract
of payoffs of the possible strategies within this game
for Cnqe = 144, DNaE = 10 and n = 1.00. The auditor's
minimum payoff for the non-cooperative game, if the
auditee plays his strategies H, is 16.66, that is,
e^x*,!!) = 16.66, meaning that x* = s1x; if the auditee
plays L, it is 20.62, that is, e1(x*,L) = 20.62, meaning
that x* = s1x; and because e2(s1x,H) <= e2(s2z,L), we have
an equilibrium pair (s1x,H) .
However, the equilibrium pair could be a mixture of pairs
of strategies; for example, Appendix A.2 (page 215),
shows the payoffs of the possible strategies within this
game for CNQE = 40, DNQE = 10 and n = 1.00. The auditor's
payoff for the non-cooperative game if the auditee plays
his strategy H, is 11.50, that is, e1(x*,H)= 11.5, meaning
that x* = s2z, but e2(s2z,H) is not less than or equal to
e2(s2z,L). The auditor's minimum payoff, if the auditee
plays L, is 18.80, that is, e1(x*,L)= 18.80, meaning that
x* = s1x, but ez(s1x,L) is not less than or equal to
e2(s1x,H). Therefore, there is a mixture (see Thomas
(1984)), that is, x* is a mixture of s2z, s1x, and y* is a
mixture of H, L; hence, for the joint strategies (s2z, H)
the payoff is (11.50, 45.00) (auditor, auditee); for
(s2z, L) it is (20.50, 10.00); for (s1x, H) it is (16.40,
65.43); and for (s1x, L) it is (18.80, 86.98), of playing
each.
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To find the limits of the joint strategy, we change the
auditor's amount of damages on the x axis until the
actual joint strategy shifts to another joint strategy.
Appendix A.4 (page 222), with an extract of Table 4 and 5
shows how it works; for example, the minimum payoffs for
Cnqe = 14 3, the auditor's damages on the x axis,
identified in Table 4, are 16.65 and 20.60, which point
out the randomized joint strategy Rr(2z 1X), the same
strategies as in Table 1 (see appendix A.2, page 215);
however, the minimum payoffs for CNQE = 14 4, the auditor's
damages on the x axis, identified in Table 5, are 16.66
and 20.62, which point out the joint pure strategy H1X.
There is only one pure strategy because the minimum cost
pair (16.66, 65.43) is less than the minimum cost pair
(20.62, 86.98). Given their motivation to minimize cost,
no one would like to, unilaterally, change his strategy.
We do the same process for the auditee's damages on the y
axis. Let us look at pattern one as an illustration of
pattern building.
Building pattern one
The "solution" we take in a non-cooperative game is the
Nash equilibrium. The first example sets n = 1.00
meaning society does not recognize the auditor's effort
when he has chosen test A, which reveals to him the
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auditee's strategy. Remember that the minimum damages
regime has damages CNQE >= 40 and DN0E >=10; that is, the
minimum damages. Table 21 shows the joint strategies in
a non-cooperative game for various damages regime (CNQE,
-,NQ ) •





Space Space Auditor, and Auditor, and
Auditee payoff Auditee payoff







Lax 39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
R Randomized

















* ; means infinite number.
The letter "n" (n = 1.00) indicates no inducement if the
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auditor chooses test A,. The joint strategies for the
auditee and the auditor is shown under the "Joint
Strategy". The numbers under "CN0E space" (>9082) and
under "DNQE space" (>10) indicate respectively the
intercepts on the x and y axes for the range of damages
for the auditor and auditee. These are the ranges of
damages or spaces for damage regimes within which the
strategy identified is in equilibrium. The numbers under
H (Auditor, and Auditee payoff) or L (Auditor, and
Auditee payoff) represent the range of expected costs
according with the range of damages for the auditor and
auditee and the other fixed variables. The first number
39.00, or the first line of numbers 18.43-38.99, before
the comma, indicates the auditor's expected cost range
corresponding to his damages range. The second number
160.00, or second line of numbers 65.43-* after the
comma, indicates the auditee's expected cost range
corresponding to his damages range. The bold numbers
(e.g., 33.00, 155.00) under H or L refer to the minimum
















Figure 13 Non-Cooperative game n = 1.00
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Figure 13 shows schematically (not to scale) the joint
strategies within the auditee and the auditor damages
spaces corresponding to Table 21; for example, if
society imposes damages to the auditor and the auditee
such that Cnqe and DNQE are within space 5 of Figure 13,
then the solution to the game is the joint randomized
strategy Rri2ZiW.
We will now explain the notation used for the joint
strategy. The capital letter R means Randomized
strategy. If the capital letter R is alone (e.g., as in
space 2 in Figure 13) this means a randomization over the
pure strategies within that space, in that case over H1x
and 1>2X. If the capital letter R is with a subscript
(e.g., RR(2z 1xj) it means the auditee randomizes over his
strategies H and L and the auditor over his strategies s2z
and s1x. In that case, Rr(2z 1X), we can not write down R
explicitly as the probabilities with which the auditee
plays H, L on s2z, s1x vary as damages CNQE and DNQE vary in
that space. The capital letters L and H mean
respectively Low level and High level of care taken by
the auditee and are associated with a pure strategy.
A subscript to capital letter H or L could have one or
two numbers alternately with capital letter and refers to
the auditor's choice between tests A2 and A,. Two
subscript numbers alternately with capital letter (e.g
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H1X1X) means the auditor has chosen A1. The subscript
first number and capital letter indicate the auditor
strategy when the auditee has chosen H (see Appendix 1,
page 200). The subscript last number and capital letter
indicate the auditor strategy related to the auditee
strategy L; but one subscript number (e.g., H2Z, space 4
in Figure 13) means he has chosen A2. The subscript
number itself refers to the auditor's choice between
tests B1 and B2. The subscript number itself refers to
the auditor's choice between tests B1 and B2.
For example, if society, through a regulator and/or court
imposes damages against the auditee and the auditor such
that Dnqe and CN0E fall within space 3 of Figure 13, then
the solution in the game as shown in Table 21 is the
joint pure strategy H1x. The auditee strategy is H and
the auditor strategy is s1x (A2, B1 :Q,NQ) .
We will now explain the calculation used for the expected
payoff. For example, to calculate 16.66 the auditor
payoff of the joint strategy H1x in Table 21, we sum his
costs and damages along with the probabilities:
[CB1 + rpC°E + (1-rjpCNQE + t (1-p) C°NE + (l-t)(l-
P)CNQNE ]?
and for 65.43, the payoff of the auditee (second line,
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Table 21), we have:
[Dh + rpD°E + (l-r)pDNQE + t(l-p)D°NE + (1-t)(1-
p)dnqne ]•
Agreeing with the number given to the fixed numerical
variables and the damages of CNQE = 14 4 and DNQE = 10 and n
= 1.00, the auditor expected payoff is:
{[3 + (0.95)(0.05)(20) + (0.05)(0.05)(144) +
(0.10)(0.95)(40) + (0.90)(0.95)(10)] = 16.66;
and the auditee expected payoff is:
[35 + (0.95) (0.05) (220) + (0.05) (0.05) (10) +
(0.10)(0.95)(120) + (0.90)(0.95)(10)]} = 65.43.
The range of the auditor and auditee payoff between the
relative auditor's damages 144 and 852 (144<<852) and the
relative auditee's damages greater than 10 (>10) suggest
the joint strategy H1x.
The inducement "n" is now changed from n = 1.00 to
examine the effect of changing "n" on the pattern. The
end of the pattern happens at n = 0.78. In the range of
n = 1.00 to n = 0.78, the auditee and the auditor stick
to the same joint strategies. Table 22 shows the joint
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Table 22 Non-Cooperative game n = 0.78
Joint Cnqe Dmqe H L
Strategy Space Space Auditor, and Auditor, and
Auditee payoff Auditee payoff
>9082 >10 39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
H1X 852« >10 18.43-38.99, 33.01-176.95,
9082 65.43- * 86.98- *
39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
R Randomized

















* : means infinite number.



















Figure 14 Non-Cooperative game n = 0.78
Figure 14 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with n = 0.78. Note that the dividing lines
in Figure 14 are horizontal or vertical. The horizontal
line belongs to the shift of strategies due to different
auditee amounts of damages. The vertical lines belong to
the shift of strategies due to different auditor amounts
of damages. These lines mean that each player's strategy
is independent of the other player's strategy. His
choice of strategy results from bargaining to minimize
his cost.
Note that Table 21 and Table 22 are identical except for
the inducement "n". Also note that Figure 14 shows an
identical pattern of strategies to Figure 13. Table 23
and Figure 15 show schematically the result representing
the pattern of strategies associated with the range n =
1.00 to n = 0.78.
Pattern one
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Table 23 and Figure 15 show that if society, through a
regulator and/or a court, imposes relative damages
against the auditor between 40 and 144 (40<<144) and the
auditee between 10 and 127 (10«127) , then the auditee
and the auditor choose the space identified 5 in
Figure 15; that is, the randomized non-pure strategy
Rr(2z ix>* Note that the strategy in space 5 is the same in
Figure 13 for n = 1.00 and Figure 14 for n = 0.78.
Consequently, the strategy is identical between n = 1.00
and n = 0.78 and we label this space 5. The name of the
other spaces follows the same logic.
We will now explain the calculation of the randomized
non-pure strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium in this
setting is found in two stages: first, the probability
the auditor will choose strategy (s means strategy) s2z
(A2, B2,NQ,NQ; see Appendix 2, page 2 00) is set so that
the auditor is indifferent between strategies s2z and s1x
(A2, B1,Q,NQ) ? second, the probability the auditee will
choose strategy H is set so that the auditee is
indifferent between high and low level of care. For any
combination of society damages within space 5, there will
be an equilibrium? however, the probabilities with which
we play H,L on s2z, s1x vary as CNQE and DNQE vary in that
space. Let us look at two examples within space 5.
Firstly, if society sets a damages for the auditor of 40
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Table 23 Pattern One
1.00 >= n >= 0.78
Joint Cnqe Dnqe H L
Strategy Space Space Auditor, and Auditor, and
Auditee payoff Auditee payoff







Lac 39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
R Randomized

















* : means infinite number.
(40 on x axis) and for the auditee of 10 (10 on y axis),
the auditor chooses s22 with probability 0.38 and s1x with
probability 0.62, whereas the auditee chooses H with
probability 0.26 and L with probability 0.74. (For
detailed techniques in deriving randomized equilibria,
see Thomas, 1984). The expected "value" (cost) of this
game according to damages set is (18.18, 57.64); 18.18
for the auditor and 57.64 for the auditee. The
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calculation for the auditor (18.18) is:
(2155/5655 [11.50(17/66) + 20.50(49/66)] + 3500/5655
[16.40(17/66) + 18.80(49/66)]);
and for the auditee (57.64) is:
(17/66 [45(2155/5655) + 65.43(3500/5655)] + 49/66
[10(2155/5655) + 86.98(3500/5655)]).
Secondly, if society sets damages equal to 143 (143 on x
axis) for the auditor and 126 (126 on y axis) for the
auditee, the auditor chooses s22 with probability 0.99 and
s1x with probability 0.01, whereas the auditee chooses H
with probability asymptotic to 1.00 and L with
probability asymptotic to 0.00. The expected "value"
(cost) of this game is (16.66, 50.93); 16.66 for the
auditor and 50.93 for the auditee. The expected "value"
of the last game is less than the first game (18.18,
57.64) set at the lowest damages within that space. The
auditee, by his effort, influences favourably the value
of the game.
The other spaces suggest at least one pure strategy.
These strategies are identical for n varying between 1.00
and 0.78.
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Figure 15 Pattern One
The space identified 1 in Figure 15, is for the
highest damages and suggests that both the auditee and
the auditor give up in terms of effort. The auditor
qualifies no matter if a material error is found or not,
and the auditee takes low care over the accounting
information system. This strategy corroborates that a
low-pooling equilibrium exists when damages are high in
relation to the audit benefit.
The space identified 2 in Figure 15, H1x, L^, and R
(randomized over pure strategies H1x and L^), suggests
that both the auditee and the auditor randomized over two
pure strategies. The unique Nash equilibrium implies a
distribution of probability over them. Thus, as an
illustration, the auditor may choose to play s1x with
probability 0.42 and s2K with probability 0.58;
similarly, the auditee may choose the same probabilities
over H and L.
The space identified 3 in Figure 15, H1x, suggests that
both the auditee and the auditor agree to higher effort
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and cost. The auditor has chosen the extended audit test
B1 and his audit opinion relies on the test's signal? at
the same time, the auditee has chosen the highest level
of care H.
The space identified 4 in Figure 15, H2Z, bounded on the x
axis 40 < Cnqe < 144, and y axis DNQE>127 has only a pure
strategy. It is suggested that only the auditee agrees
to higher effort and has chosen the highest level of care
H.
Table 24 Auditee and Auditor effort
1.00 >= n >= 0.78
Figure Joint Auditee Auditor








3 H1X High b1





The space identified 5 in Figure 15 bounded on the x axis
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40 < Cnoe < 144, and y axis 10 < DN0E < 127 has two
randomized strategies R„(2Z 1X).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditee, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the selection of
damages associated with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when
the state of accounting information is in error (E). A
choice of damages from space 4 (H2Z, Figure 15) , where the
auditor does not qualify no matter if a material error is
found or not, implies that society perceives the function
of the audit as being not to find material error, but
rather to induce higher effort on the part of the auditee
and thus reduce the likelihood of material error. Note
that the auditee randomizes within spaces 2 and 5.
If society therefore adopts a policy towards the audit
which encourages randomized effort (high and low) by the
auditee, then this implies the adoption of spaces 2 (H1x,
and R) and 5 (RR(2z 1X)) . One of the advantages of
encouraging randomized strategies is that it adds an
uncertainty which could confuse the other player.
The auditee's choice has the same pattern throughout the
illustration of non-cooperative games; thus the above
analysis related strictly to the auditee applies
throughout all the patterns revealed by the non-
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cooperative game.
Table 25 Pattern One: Auditor strategies choice
1.00 >= n >= 0.78
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort
>9,082 1 aj, bj; q, q
852-9,082 2 a2, b1; q, nq
or
a2, b2; q, q
b1





or; means the auditor randomizes over the strategies
As shown in Figure 15 and Table 25, the auditor's high
effort, for the range n = 1.00 to n = 0.78, is B,, and
therefore his audit opinion is qualified if test B1
signals a material error and otherwise is not qualified.
As regards auditor high effort, none of the four
auditor's strategies (Table 25) corresponding to the five
spaces (Figure 15) includes test A1 which reveals the
auditee's strategy; hence the most rigorous audit work
is that of space 3 (H1x) which includes the extended test,
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Consequently, the inducement "n" must be less than 0.78
to convince the auditor to choose A,. Mathematically, the
reduction of damages to n = 0.78 does not cover the fixed
fees CA1 in any space within this pattern.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test by the auditors, then this implies the adoption
of space 3 (H1x) for the selection of damages associated
with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when the state of
accounting information is in error (E).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditee and a qualification
outcome dependent on the result of test B1 by the auditor,
then it is looking ideally for the parties to adopt space
3 (H1x) for the selection of damages associated with a
non-qualified opinion (NQ) when the state of accounting
information is in error (E).
The essential features of pattern one are:
1) society could influence the auditor behaviour by
adopting auditee damages policies in respect of the
audit;
2) society could not influence the auditee behaviour by
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adopting different auditee damages except for space 4 and
5;
3) the audit opinion (gualified/non-gualified) could not
be contingent on the auditee's choice, since the auditor
does not know that choice (he does not play A.,) .
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 1.00 to 0.78 (pattern one) to 0.76 to 0.67 (pattern
two); but first, let us explain how a reduced normal
form using the unique inducement n = 0.77 works although
Table 26 for n = 0.77 is not a pattern of its own as
defined above. We do not present it as a pattern because
of its peculiarity of being a unique, discrete point and
the difficulty for society to secure a policy on a
discrete point.
Reduced normal form
Many games can be simplified through the use of dominance
arguments. Table 26 shows the equilibrium pairs before
applying the principle of dominance. The reduced normal
form is obtained by removing the dominated equilibrium
pairs.
Table 26, n = 0.77, represents relative damages for the
auditor between 8698 and 9198 and for the auditee between
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Table 2 6 Game in Normal Form
n = 0.77












H1X1K A.j, B.j: Q, NQ






H1X1X A^, ! Q, NQ





Hixu ai, B^: Q, NQ





**1X2X A1, B^: Q, NQ











^2K A2 / B2: Q, Q 39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
# means dominated joint strategy
16 and 43. A # identifies the dominated equilibrium
pairs within Table 26. For example, if the auditee has
chosen his strategy H, the auditor could play any of
these strategies: s1x1K, s1x1x, s1x1y/ s1x2x, s1x2Y, and he has
the same payoff; but if the auditee has chosen his
strategy L, the auditor, as an intelligent and rational
decision maker, maximizes his utility by choosing only
strategy, among those strategies, s1x1K which minimizes his
cost. The expected cost range for the auditor of joint
strategies L1X1K, 41.00, is less than the expected cost
range of the other joint strategies except the last one
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(L^) *









Auditor, and Auditor, and
Auditee payoff Auditee payoff
^1X1K ^1' * Q/NQ
I Q, Q




39.00, 160.00 33.00, 155.00
Table 27 shows the reduced normal form of game. The four
other joint strategies (H1X1X, H1x1y, H1X2X and H1X2Y) are





















144 852 8698 9198
>NQ
Figure 16 Reduced non-cooperative game n = 0.77
Figure 16 shows the strategies after applying the
principle of dominance. Note that the inducement n =
0.77 incites the auditor within spaces 2.1 and 2.2 to
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employ test A.,, the test revealing the auditee's strategy;
hence the fixed fee of test A,, CM, has been covered at
the n = 0.77. Within this chapter only the joint
strategies that the equilibrium pairs are not dominated
last in the figures. Through the following patterns, the
analysis is only from the reduced normal form of the
game.
It should be remembered that this pattern n = 0.77 is
used only to show how an illustration of the dominance
concept. Let us examine the effect of changing the range
of "n" from 1.00 to 0.78 (pattern one) to 0.76 to 0.67
(pattern two).
Pattern two
As previously stated in pattern one, none of the auditor
strategies includes test A,, the test which reveals to the
auditor the auditee strategy. To encourage the inclusion
of test A1 in the auditor's strategy, it is necessary to
offer an incentive in the form of a percentage less than
0.78 (n < 0.78) payable on the total damages otherwise
suffered by the auditor in the event of a failure to
qualify a materially inaccurate set of statements.
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144 852 8333 8793 9318
144 852 6061 9974 10570
Figure 17 Pattern Two
We will now explain the supplement notation (e.g., H1X1X)
in Figure 17. We must remember that two subscript
numbers alternately with a capital letter means the
auditor has chosen A1. The subscript first number and
capital letter indicate the auditor strategy when the
auditee has chosen H (see Appendix 2, page 200). The
subscript last number and capital letter indicate the
auditor strategy related to the auditee strategy L. The
subscript number itself refers to the auditor's choice
between tests B1 and B2. The subscript capital letter
refers to the auditor's action: K = Q,Q; X = Q,NQ; Y =
NQ,Q; and Z = NQ,NQ; as a result, the auditor's
strategy is to "threaten" the auditee.
For example, in spaces 2.2 and 2.3 (Figure 17), if the
auditor has chosen test A1 and the auditee has chosen High
level of care of the accounting information, the auditor
chooses test B1 and his opinion is dependent on the result
of the latter test; that is, IX. However, if the auditee
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has chosen Low level of care, the auditor threatens him
with qualifying, no matter if a material error is found
or not.
The numbers of threats and the threat itself vary with
the auditee's relative damages selected by society; for
example, if the auditee's relative damages (space 2.2 and
2.3) is between 10 and 35,842, the auditor's threat (K =
Q,Q) if the auditee has shirked is to qualify no matter
if a material error is found or not; nevertheless, these
threats are less of an answer than they appear to be.
An audit strategy where the opinion is insensitive to the
audit results such as qualify or not qualify no matter if
a material error is found or not (K = Q,Q or Z = NQ,NQ),
or is opposite to the result of the B test (2Y or 1Y),
does not improve welfare. The only strategies which
could improve welfare is IX or 2X which have a
qualification outcome dependent on the result of the B
test. The purpose of society's audit policy is not to
analyze threats; hence the precise nature of a threat is
unimportant, and the threats are therefore identified by
?? throughout the analysis of the patterns, although the
threat is still identified in the figure.
Figure 17 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.76 to n = 0.67. The only
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change in Figure 17 from Figure 15 happens between space
1 and 2. There are three new spaces that are 2.1, 2.2
and 2.3. These new spaces are an extension of space 2.
They have the same strategy root (H1X, L2K, and R) and only
one of them (H1x) is extended with a threat (H1X??) if the
auditee has chosen Low level of care. The other spaces
are identical to pattern one.
Spaces 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 suggest that the auditor agrees
to employ the test A1 which reveals the auditee's strategy
within one of his strategies; however, only within space
2.2 and 2.3 does the auditor threaten the auditee. If
test A1 reveals that the auditee has chosen High level of
care, the auditor chooses the extended test B1, and his
audit opinion relies on his observation of the test
signal; otherwise, he qualifies (threat) no matter if a
material error is found or not. Within the same spaces,
the auditee randomizes over H and L. Note that the fixed
fee of test A,, CA1, has been covered at the starting
range n = 0.76.
To calculate the damages limit, CNQE, the cost of H1x is
set equal to H1x?? and by elimination we obtain:
(1-r) pCNQE = CA1 + (1-r) pnCNQE; (1)
and the lower limit is obtained by isolating CA1 from the
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equation (1) and solving for CNQ£:
cN°E = CAi/(1_n) d-rjp? (2)
and the upper limit, as shown in Figure 13 for n = 1.00,
must equal 9,082, the maximum damages before the auditor
gives up in terms of effort and qualifies no matter if a
material error is found or not (space 1). So putting
9,082 in equation (1), we obtain:
isolating nCNQE from the equation (3) and solving for CNQE:
For example, in Figure 17, for n = 0.76, CA1 = 5, p = 0.05
and r = 0.95, the lower limit is 5/(0.24) (0.05) (0.05) =
8,333 and the upper is {[9,082 - 5/(0.05) (0.05)]/(0.76) }
= 9,318.
As shown in Figure 17 and Table 28, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, A1, and B1. As regards the
auditor's highest effort, one of his strategies
(Table 28) corresponding to spaces 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
(Figure 17) includes randomly the test revealing the
auditee' s strategy A1 and the extended test B1; hence the
(l-r)p(9,082)= CA1 + (1-r) pnCNQE; (3)
Cnqe = {[(9,082) - CA1/(l-r)p]/n). (4)
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Table 28 Pattern Two: Auditor strategies choice
0.76 >= n >= 0.67
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort







A1, : Q, NQ
A), B?: ?, ?
or





2 A2, B1: Q, NQ
or
A2, B2: Q, Q
B1




A2, B1: Q, NQ bi
or: means the auditor randomizes over the strategies
most rigorous audit work is within these spaces.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditor to employ test A1, then this
implies the adoption of spaces 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 (H1X??, h2K
and R).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and selection of
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test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B., by the auditor, then it is looking for the
parties to adopt spaces 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 (H1X??,and R) .
Note that an increase of auditee's damages influences the
auditor's possible threat; for example, at auditee
damages greater than 35,842, the auditor in the space 2.1
agrees to choose test B1 no matter what the auditee
strategy and his qualification outcome relies on the
test's signal.
The essential feature of pattern two is that society
could influence the auditor to employ test A1 which
reveals the auditee's strategy. High auditee damages
result in the auditor choosing test B1 no matter what the
auditee strategy, which suggests that the auditor is
preoccupied by the material error and does not threaten
the auditee; but society's welfare is worse than that
provided by the space 2 because the cost to employ test A1
and the threat of such damages are useless.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"




Figure 18 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.66 to n = 0.53. The only
change in Figure 18 from Figure 17 happens between spaces
2 and 3. There are two new spaces that are 2.4 and 2.5.
These new spaces are an extension from space 2. They
have the same strategy root (H1X, L^and R) and only the
auditor's action IX is extended with a threat (L,?1x) if
the auditee has chosen High level of care.
These new spaces suggest that if the auditee has chosen
High level of care, then the auditor, when he employs
test A.,, can only afford a dominant strategy as a threat
that is qualified if the auditee damages are less than
1302, and non-qualified if they are more than 1302 no
matter if a material error is found or not. However, if
the auditee has chosen Low level of care, the auditor
chooses test B1 and his qualification outcome depends on
its signal. The other spaces are identical to pattern
two.
Spaces 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that the auditor agrees to
employ the test A1 within one of his strategies. If test
A1 reveals that the auditee has chosen Low level of care,
the auditor chooses the extended test B1, and his audit
opinion relies on his observation of the test signal;
otherwise he threatens the auditee. Within the same














































Figure 18 Pattern Three
The auditee's best strategy within these two spaces is
Low level of care. If the auditor has employed the test
A1, and the auditee Low level of care, the auditee avoids
the auditor threats. If the auditor does not employ test
A1# he does not know the auditee strategy. In these two
strategies the auditor chooses test B1 and his audit
opinion relies on his observation of the test signal;
therefore, a choice of auditor's damages from this space
implies that society perceives the function of the audit
as being to put the responsibility for a material error
on the auditor.
An interpretation of the auditor's behaviour could be
that, if the auditee has chosen H, it is not worthwhile
to carry out any extended test; but if he has chosen L,
the auditor chooses the extended test B1 and his audit
opinion relies on the test signal.
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Table 29 Pattern Three: Auditor strategies choice
0.66 >= n >= 0.53
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort







Ai, B1: Q, NQ
A1, B,: ?, ?
or





2 Aj, B1: Q, NQ
or







Ai, B2: ?, ?











A2, B1: Q, NQ B1
or: means the auditor randomizes over the strategies
As shown in Figure 18 and Table 29, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, A1, and B1. As regards the auditor
highest efforts, one of his strategies (Table 29) within
spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 includes the test
revealing the auditee's strategy, test A,, and the
extended test, B1; hence the most rigorous audit work is
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within these spaces.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditor to employ test A1, then this
implies the adoption of spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and
2.5.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and selection of
test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B,, then it is looking ideally for the parties to
adopt spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
The essential feature of pattern three within spaces 2.4
and 2.5 implies that society perceives the function of
the audit as being to find material error by the auditor.
Let us examine the effect of changing the range of "n"
from 0.52 to 0.51.
Pattern four
Figure 19 shows schematically the pattern of strategies
associated with the range n = 0.52 to n = 0.51. The only
change in Figure 19 from Figure 18 happens in space








































































Figure 19 Pattern Four
spaces that are 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. They have
the same strategy root (Rr^zix)) '• remember that R with
subscripts could be H or L, and only the auditor's action
2Z is extended with a threat (L,^) if the auditee has
chosen High level of care. The threats are any action
except 2Z. The auditor does not agree to any effort
within those five spaces except test A, to get the
inducement and reveal the auditee's strategy. The other
spaces are identical to pattern three.
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Spaces 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 suggest that the
auditor agrees to employ test A1 within one of his
strategies. If test A1 reveals that the auditee has
chosen Low level of care, he does not qualify no matter
if a material error is found or not; otherwise, he
threatens the auditee with any of the other actions.
Within the same spaces the auditee randomizes over H and
L.
The auditee's best strategy within these five spaces is
Low level of care. If the auditor has employed the test
A1 and the auditee Low level of care, the auditor does not
qualify no matter whether a material error is found or
not. If the auditor does not employ test A1, he does not
know the auditee strategy and he does not qualify no
matter whether a material error is found or not:
therefore, a choice of damages from this space implies
that society perceives the function of the audit as being
to keep down cost; either because the auditor does not
apply test A1 or, if he does (to earn the discount) ,
because he then forces the auditee to make low effort.
As shown in Figure 19 and Table 30, the auditor's high
efforts are A1 and B1, A1, and B1. As regards the
auditor's highest effort, one of his strategies
(Table 30) in space 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, and the only
one in space 5.5 (Figure 19), includes the test revealing
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Table 30 Pattern four: Auditor strategies choice
0.52 >= n >= 0.51
Damages adopted Figure Auditor's Auditor's
by society space strategy effort







ai, b1: q, nq
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or: means the auditor randomizes over the strategies
the auditee's strategy A1.
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If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditor to employ test A1# then this
implies the adoption of spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5,
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. A choice of spaces 5.1,
5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 incites the auditee to choose low
level of care.
The essential feature of pattern four within spaces 5.1,
5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 is society's perception that the
function of the audit is to keep down cost either by
encouraging the auditor to not play test A1, or if he does
(to earn the discount and reveal the auditee's strategy),
then he forces the auditee to make low effort.
Let us look at the summary of these four patterns.
Summary
The following summary centres on the possible attitudes
of society towards the patterns by the auditee and the
auditor.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditee, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3 and 4 for the selection of
damages associated with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when
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the state of accounting information is in error (E).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages randomized effort (high and low) by the
auditee, then this implies the adoption of spaces 2, 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5; 5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages qualification outcome dependent on result of
test B1 by the auditors, then this implies the adoption of
space 3 (H1x) for the selection of damages associated with
a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when the state of accounting
information is in error (E).
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages only the auditee to make high effort and a
qualification outcome dependent on the result of test B1
by the auditor, then it is looking ideally for the
parties to adopt space 3 (H1X) .
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages the auditor to employ test A1, then this
implies the adoption of spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5,
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and selection of
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test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B,, then it is looking ideally for the parties to
adopt spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
Let us examine the overlap of pattern one of cooperative
and non-cooperative game.
Overlapped pattern one
Can the same pair of strategies be a solution of a
cooperative and non-cooperative game? Could a
cooperative game shows the same choice of strategies as a
non-cooperative game within the same space; that is,
within the same society damages regime? Starting from
the strategies within these spaces, we can not
differentiate if the players play a cooperative or a non-
cooperative game.
The interest of overlapping cooperative and non-
cooperative game patterns is to observe the similarities
between the two games; furthermore, we will see where
the line is drawn between a cooperative and a non-
cooperative strategy. Could a cooperative game appear to
be a non-cooperative game? Some spaces are identical.
The overlap is interesting; for example, if CNQE, DNQE are
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selected from an overlapping zone then the game can be
represented as non-cooperative for public consumption;
that is, the auditor is independent, but in reality the
game is played as cooperative.
Figure 20 shows the overlap of pattern one from the
cooperative and non-cooperative games. Only the similar
strategy spaces are identified. Spaces 1, 3, and 4 (L^,
H1X, and H2Z) are the same for the two different games.
Within these spaces there is no strategy differentiation
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Figure 20 Overlap pattern one
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
175
encourages high effort by the auditees, then this implies
the adoption of spaces 3 (H1X) and 4 (H2Z) . A choice of
damages from space 4 (H2Z) where the auditor does not
qualify no matter if a material error is found or not,
implies that society perceives the function of the audit
as being not to find material error, but rather to induce
higher effort on the part of the auditee and thus reduce
the likelihood of material error.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and qualification
outcome dependent on the result of test B1 by the auditor,
then it is looking ideally for the parties to adopt the
space 3 (H1x) . A choice of damages from space 3 (H1X) ,
where the auditee has chosen High level of care and the
auditor qualification outcome relies on the extended test
B.,'s signal, implies that society perceives the function
of the audit as being to reduce the likelihood of
material error and to find it if it does occur.
As regards the auditor's high effort, none of the three
spaces includes test A1 which reveals the auditee's
strategy; hence the most rigorous audit work is that of
space 3 (H1x) which includes the extended test B,.
Let us examine the overlap of patterns when the auditor
has employed test A1 which reveals the auditee's strategy.
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Overlapped pattern two
Figure 21 shows the overlap of pattern four from the
cooperative game and pattern two from the non-cooperative
game. We must remember that pattern two from the non-
cooperative game (0.76 >= n >= 0.67) is the first pattern
in which the auditor agrees to employ test A1 which
reveals the auditee's strategy. The only pattern from
the cooperative game which encloses the inducement of
pattern two from non-cooperative game is pattern four;
that is, the non-cooperative inducement space 0.76 >= n
>= 0.67 is enclosed within the cooperative one 0.82 >= n
>= 0.65. Only the similar strategy spaces are
identified. Spaces 1; 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1; 3; and 4
(L^, H1x__, H1x, and H22) are the same for the two different
games. Within these spaces there is no strategy
differentiation between the cooperative and non-
cooperative game.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees, then this implies
the adoption of all similar spaces (H1x__, H1x, and H2Z)
except space 1 (L^) . A choice of damages from space 4
(H2z) in which the auditor does not qualify no matter if a
material error is found or not, implies that society
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Figure 21 Overlap pattern two
perceives the function of the audit as being not to find
material error, but rather to induce higher effort on the
part of the auditee and thus reduce the likelihood of
material error.
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages qualification outcome dependent on result of
test B1 by the auditor, then this implies the adoption of
space 3 (H1x) .
If society adopts a policy towards the audit which
encourages high effort by the auditees and selection of
test A1 and qualification outcome dependent on the result
of test B1 by the auditor, then it is looking ideally for
178
the parties to adopt spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 (H1X.J .
A choice of damages from these spaces, where the auditee
has chosen High level of care and the auditor
qualification outcome relies on the extended test B1
signal, implies that society perceives the function of
the audit as being to reduce the likelihood of material
error and to find it should it occur and reveal the
auditee•s strategy.
Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 21, the overlap of
cooperative game pattern four (Figure 8, page 117) over
non-cooperative game pattern two (Figure 15, page 149)
with an inducement "n" of 0.76 or less must convince the
auditor to choose test A1 within any of the two types of
game.
The essential feature of overlap pattern two is that
society could influence the auditor to choose test A1 by
adopting an inducement "n" of 0.76 or less, without
consideration of the type of game.
Conclusion
Non-cooperative games may, as is the case here, include
communication between the parties. A few relevant
observations about this game are in order. First, it is
179
an example of a non-cooperative game, meaning the players
are unable to make a binding and enforceable agreement.
If such a binding agreement is possible, then they would
cooperate. Second, if nothing really hinges on their
being unable to communicate but neither trusts the other,
then the dilemma still exists. Third, it is not
necessary to measure the value or utility of the outcomes
of the players; information about their preference
orderings is sufficient. Fourth, the players need not be
facing the same decision, nor have identical sets of
alternative courses of action. The essential factor is
the pattern of interaction between the possible actions
and the player's preferences for the outcomes.
This chapter has explored, through a non-cooperative game
theory of the audit, how the auditee's and the auditor's
strategic choices are influenced by the damages imposed
on the auditee and the auditor for issuing a materially
inaccurate set of statements without a qualified audit
opinion. It is seen that these damages must be
established mainly for the auditor within a specific
range of "n" and specified spaces, the choice of "n" and
spaces being dependent upon the policy objectives of
society. Possible policy objectives considered are: (1)
to induce the auditee to make high effort; (2) to induce
qualification outcome dependent on the result of test B1
by the auditor; (3) to encourage the auditor to employ
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test A1; and (4) to induce the auditee to make high
effort and selection of test A1 and qualification outcome
dependent on the result of test B1 through the behavioural
effect of the audit.
In policy objective (1) above, it is shown that the
auditee is indifferent to damages greater than the audit
risk except for spaces 4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5
(see Figure 19, page 168) when his relative damages are
greater than 127. This implies that society could only
influence in other spaces through damages imposed upon
the auditor.
In policy objective (2) above, it is shown that the
auditor has chosen test B1 (space 3) within all the
patterns.
The combination of the policy (1) and (2) which we have
considered tells us that if society adopts a policy
towards the audit which encourages high effort by the
auditees and qualification outcome dependent on the
result of test B1, then it is looking ideally for the
parties to adopt the space 3 (H1X) . Note that this space
is in all patterns including the overlapped ones, and the
cheapest pattern in term of inducement for society is
pattern One.
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In policy objective (3) above, society must offer an
inducement in the form of a discount on the damages
suffered by the auditor in the event of a failure to
qualify a materially inaccurate set of statements. This
implies that society perceives the function of the audit
as being necessarily a qualification outcome contingent
on the auditee's choice. It is seen that an inducement
of at least 0.76 (Figure 14, page 146) is necessary for
the auditor to employ test A, which reveals the auditee's
strategy.
Note that pattern Two has an inducement of 0.76 >= n >=
0.67, meaning that society gives up between twenty-four
and thirty-three percent of the total damages otherwise
suffered by the auditor in the event of a failure to
qualify a materially inaccurate set of statements. A
choice of this space and "n" is the cheapest way for
society to get high effort from the auditee and the most
rigorous audit.
The policy objective (4) above combines the three other
policy objectives considered. This implies that society
perceives the function of the audit as being necessarily
a qualification outcome contingent on the auditee's
choice and the signal of material error; however, only
spaces 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 through patterns two
to four show that society perceives the function of the
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audit as being to reveal the auditee's strategy and to
find material error. A choice of spaces 2.1, 2.2, and
2.3 implies that society perceives the function of the
audit as being to induce high effort on the part of the
auditee and thus reduce the likelihood of material error.
It is seen that society inducement "n" modifies firstly
space 2 (H1X, and R) (pattern two and three) and
secondly space 5 (R,^ 1X), pattern four) . Only the spaces
containing randomized strategies benefit from the
inducement. The latter does not affect the pure unique
strategy spaces.
It is shown through the patterns of this non-cooperative
game that under a policy objective of maximizing auditor
effort, setting the damages too high or too low results
in the auditor adopting a strategy with the audit opinion
(qualified or non-qualified) being indifferent to the
results of the audit. There is a need for damages, but
extreme damages levels are counterproductive. The
auditee and the auditor frequently use a randomized
strategy; that is, sometimes additional effort is used
and sometimes it is not used. This result is analogous
to Fellingham and Newman (1985).
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this investigation has been to help society to
understand audit policies accompanied by a properly
managed damages regime. We argue that society should
give properly managed incentive to the auditor and that
it is better off with the cooperative than the non-
cooperative game since the same outcomes are achieved at
lower cost.
Using a rudimentary game theoretical model of the audit,
through cooperative and non-cooperative game, we have
explored how the auditee's and auditor's strategic
choices are influenced by damages imposed on them for
issuing a materially inaccurate set of statements without
a gualified audit opinion. We have observed the effects
of damages and inducement on the function of audit.
Appropriate audit policies are revealed to suit different
objectives or attitudes toward the audit on the part of
society. Moreover, we argue for the cooperative game as
the choice for society. Lastly, we enumerate some
limitations and suggestions for future research.
Attitudes toward the audit
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The discussions centre on four possible attitudes that
society may take towards the work performed by the
auditee and the auditor. The first attitude is that the
auditee should be employing high levels of effort in
order to reduce the probability of material error. The
second attitude is that the auditor should be employing
powerful quantitative tests in order to increase the
probability of any material error being discovered. The
third attitude is that the auditor should be employing
qualitative tests in order to reveal the auditee's
strategy. The fourth attitude is that both the auditee
and the auditor should be employing high levels of
effort; the auditee in order to reduce the probability
of material error, and the auditor to reveal the
auditee's strategy and increase the probability of any
material error being discovered. Each of these attitudes
is investigated whilst varying the level of damages
associated with a non-qualified opinion (NQ) when the
state of accounting information is in error (E).
The first attitude considered concerns society's
influence over the auditee effort. If society adopts a
policy towards the audit which encourages a pure strategy
of high effort by the auditees, then this implies the
adoption of damages levels associated with spaces 3 and
4. Damages (DNQE) are approximately identical through all
the patterns revealed within the cooperative and non-
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cooperative games.
The second attitude considered concerns society's
influence over the auditor's effort to uncover a material
error. If society adopts a policy towards the audit
which encourages a qualification outcome dependent on the
result of a powerful quantitative test (test B1 in our
setting) used by the auditor then this implies the
adoption of space 3. This space is sustained through all
the patterns revealed within the cooperative and non-
cooperative games, although, from pattern seven in the
cooperative game, it implies that society cannot induce
this strategic choice by damages on the auditor alone.
The third attitude considered concerns society's
influence over the auditor's effort to reveal the
auditee's strategy. If society adopts a policy towards
the audit which encourages the auditor to employ test A1,
this implies the adoption of particular spaces within the
cooperative games and the non-cooperative games.
A choice of some of the particular spaces within the non-
cooperative games pinpoints the dilemma faced by an
auditor who is choosing actions that affect the auditee.
The auditor, by employing test A1, can potentially
influence the auditee to select a low level of care
(spaces 5.1,...,5.5, page 168).
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The fourth attitude considered concerns society's
influence over the auditee's effort, and the auditor's
effort to reveal the auditee's strategy and to uncover a
material error. If society adopts a policy towards the
audit which encourages the auditee to make high effort
and selection of test A1 and qualification outcome
dependent on the result of test B1, then it is looking
ideally for the adoption of the space 3.1 within the
cooperative game and of spaces with randomized strategies
2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 within the non-cooperative
game.
Audit policies
The four explored attitudes suggest through a properly
managed damages regime that the function of the audit is
perceived to be: (1) to reduce the likelihood of a
material error; (2) to reveal the auditee strategy; and
(3) to both reduce the likelihood of a material error and
reveal the auditee strategy.
If society wants to reduce the likelihood of a material
error, it could adopt the first, the second, or the first
and second attitudes through a choice of a properly
managed range of damages for the auditee, the auditor,
and the auditee and the auditor.
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A choice to induce high effort on the part of the auditee
alone implies that society wants to reduce the likelihood
of material error at the basic level and emphasizes the
auditee's responsibility for inaccurate financial
statements.
A choice to induce high effort on the part of the auditor
alone implies that society wants to reduce the likelihood
of material error at the detection level and emphasizes
the auditor's responsibility for inaccurate financial
statements.
However, if society adopts a policy towards the audit
which encourages randomized effort; that is, sometimes
additional effort is used and sometimes it is not, by the
auditee, then this implies that: (1) society takes a
"portfolio" view and is not so concerned with what
happens on individual audits; and (2) society perceives
the function of the audit as being to recognize different
expected utility from the players within the non-
cooperative game, and allows some uncertainty about the
auditee strategy which encourages the auditor to work.
Note that the latter attitude is available only through
the patterns revealed within the non-cooperative game.
Let us see what happens if society combines the two
attitudes considered above, meaning that society's main
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concern is to find material error. If society adopts a
policy towards the audit which encourages the auditee to
make high effort and a qualification outcome dependent on
the result of test B1, then it is looking ideally for the
parties to adopt space 3. This space is found in all the
patterns revealed including the overlapped patterns.
Note that there is an element of trust since the auditor
does not play the test A1 to check that the auditee is
carrying out the agreed auditee strategy; furthermore,
if there is a material error in the audited financial
statements, the auditee as well as the auditor, no matter
what game they play, will bear some risk because of it.
If society wants the auditor to reveal the auditee
strategy, it could adopt the third attitude through a
choice of a properly managed range of damages and of
inducement for the auditor.
A choice to reveal the auditee strategy through an
incentive implies that society wants to be secure that
the auditee strategy has been carried out and to induce
the auditor to reveal it.
If society wants to reduce the likelihood of a material
error and the auditee strategy to be revealed, it could
adopt the fourth attitude through a choice of a properly
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managed range of damages for the auditee and the auditor
and of inducement for the auditor.
A choice of damages from these spaces, within their
respective patterns and games, implies that society
perceives the function of the audit as being to induce
the highest effort by the auditee and the most rigorous
audit work by the auditor.
Influence of damages
The illustrations show that the auditee and the auditor
are influenced by society's set of damages; however,
these damages must be established within a specific range
of "n", which is the inducement for the auditor to play
A1, and spaces corresponding to a range of auditee/auditor
damages, the choice of "n" and spaces being dependent
upon the policy objectives of society.
Influence of inducement
Two policy implications concern society's inducement "n".
The analysis indicates that society may have strong
incentives to support a link between "n" and the work of
the auditor.
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Some factors support society giving an inducement. Pre-
commitments, when the auditor does not know the auditee
strategy, cannot be enforced because the auditee's
strategy cannot be observed; moreover, the auditee's
communication of the strategy chosen does not eliminate
the uncertainty since the audit decision must depend on
evidence collected, not on the communications of the
auditee. The inducement is critical to the auditor's
decision to include the qualitative test within his
strategy.
It is shown that society's inducement and a specific
range of damages modify firstly space 3 (pattern two,
page 109 ) of cooperative game and space 2 (pattern two,
page 158) of non-cooperative game. These spaces fulfil
the policy objective (4) to induce the auditee to make a
high effort and the auditor to select the test revealing
the auditee's strategy and to make a qualification
outcome dependent on whether the result of the test
signals a material error. This policy demands the most
work from the auditee and the auditor and provides the
greatest payoff for society.
Society's inducement "n" in a cooperative game can extend
benefits to all spaces except the space 1 (L^, pattern 7,
page 125), although in a non-cooperative game it can only
extend benefits to two randomized strategy spaces (2 and
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5, pattern 4, page 168). A society's inducement "n" of
0.76 or less could influence the auditor to employ test A1
without consideration of the type of game.
Some strategies appear in the same space for some range
of inducement "n" and of damages; for example, Figure 21
(page 177) shows that space 3 (pattern two, page 109 ) of
cooperative game overlaps space 2 (pattern two, page 158)
of non-cooperative game; consequently, we cannot
differentiate between the types of game used by the
auditee and the auditor. These latter spaces pinpoint
the fact that the extremes of cooperation and no
cooperation are not delineated within our audit setting.
Cooperative or non-cooperative game
The illustrations of the overlap pattern two (page 177)
show that society could get the most demanding work from
auditee and auditor within a cooperative or a non-
cooperative game if it manages properly its damages
regime and its inducement. The choice for society based
on the cheapest cost and the same choice of strategies
from the auditee and the auditor is a cooperative game;
consequently, if society could manage properly its
damages regime and inducement, this would imply lowest
cost for society.
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It is shown that society should give a greater inducement
to the auditor to employ the test which reveals the
auditee strategy in a non-cooperative game than in a
cooperative game; for example, society gives only five
percent within the cooperative game compared to twenty-
four percent within the non-cooperative game before the
auditor employs the test A1. There is a lot of room
between these two types of games which encourages auditor
to play a cooperative game.
It is seen within only the cooperative game that the
auditor gives an audit opinion contingent upon the signal
of test B (space 3 and 3.1) only when he selects test B1.
The cooperative and non-cooperative games show that under
a policy objective of maximizing the auditee effort,
setting the damages too high or too low results in the
auditee adopting a low level of care; however, only the
cooperative game shows that under a policy objective of
maximizing the auditor effort, setting the damages too
high or too low results in the auditor adopting a
dominant strategy, with the audit opinion (qualified or
non-qualified) being indifferent to the results of the
audit. There is a need for damages, but extreme damages
levels are counterproductive.
The auditee and the auditor, within the non-cooperative
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game, frequently use a randomized strategy. This result
is analogous to Fellingham and Newman (1985) and Anderson
and Young (1988).
Of course, given the arbitrary nature of the cost
parameters in these examples, the sensitivity over only
three variables, the discrete nature of strategies, and
the simple nature of this game, these results should not
be taken literally; nevertheless, they illustrate the
inherent strategic nature of the audit problem and the
rationale of behaviourists regarding the incentive
effects of auditing.
It should be emphasized that relationships between
payoffs and strategies derived in this model are based on
an extremely stylized audit setting. The extent to which
this model provides useful explanations of auditee and
auditor behaviour is limited. A much larger and more
complex game involving many participants and multifaceted
strategies could show other conclusions.
In this dissertation, a two-player game model has been
used because: (1) it fits; owners, etc. rarely play a
part in the game in reality; (2) it is manageable from a
games theory perspective; and (3), a regulator and/or a
court (operating on behalf of society) can be introduced
to function on behalf of other players such as owners.
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Limitation
The model used in this dissertation has many limitations.
Sensitivity is only explored with respect to two damages,
and the assignment of values to other costs is arbitrary.
It does not consider the possibility that the auditee
wishes to deceive. The audit is characterized as a
rather simple three step process. The possibility of a
damages regime offering inducements to the auditee as
well as, or instead of, the auditor is not considered.
The audit is characterized as a cooperative game, but a
fee bargaining solution is not investigated.
All players are risk neutral, implying that they are
acting as perfectly motivated representatives of groups
of well-diversified auditees and auditors. In practice,
however, individual differences are greater than group
differences; therefore, more detailed consideration of
the individual preferences of the auditee in charge of
the firm and the auditor in charge of the audit might
lead to differences in the basic results.
We assume a game of complete information; that is, one in
which the rules of the game are common knowledge among
players. The player "i" knows the rules, he knows that
other players know the rules, he knows that the other
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players know that he knows the rules, etc. In contrast,
a game of incomplete information is one in which the
rules of the game are not common knowledge among the
players. In such a game there is some asymmetry in the
information possessed by the players even at the start of
the game.
Quite often in real world situations, one or more players
misunderstand the true nature of the relation. This
difference in perception between the auditee and the
auditor affects the decision-making process, and can lead
to unexpected results.
In the simplest, incomplete information game, players
have rational expectations and common knowledge about the
uncertainty each player faces. It is assumed that there
is some pool of common knowledge about the environment
that is shared by all participants. Most real-world
games are games of incomplete information, mainly for
three reasons: first, one player often does not know the
motivations of the other player; second, one player
often does not know the "technological capabilities" of
the other players; that is, he does not know the feasible
set of action of the other players; and finally, players
differ in their knowledge of the world.
Games with mixed-strategy equilibria pose difficult
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inference problems because the researcher does not know
whether an action reflects a randomized or a pure-
strategy equilibrium outcome. It is well known that
there are often multiple Nash equilibria in games, and
that these equilibria do not necessarily provide the
players with the same expected utility.
Since in the model the effort underlying reported
financial statements is binary; that is, belongs to
[L,H], while there is in fact a continuous distribution
of auditee effort over [0,1], reported financial
statements only imperfectly reveal the auditee's private
information; nevertheless, partitioning the distribution
of auditee types into two groups, based upon the effort
underlying reported financial statements, provides
additional information to the auditor.
Although the game model used here is still controversial,
there is enough evidence that potential contributions of
the game view-point are vast; nevertheless, this
dissertation serves to demonstrate clearly the importance
of a properly managed damages regime for the control of
auditee and auditor behaviour.
Many of these points can be investigated by further
research.
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Future areas for research
Further research could be done on: a fee bargaining
solution within the cooperative game to suggest fee
structure; an inducement to the auditee in respect to
reduced damage; the order of auditee and auditor damages
under a different environment such as fraud; a different
order of auditee and auditor damage; the nature of the
relationship between the auditee or auditor and strategy;
knowledge or no knowledge of accounting effort, which
should really be modelled as a partially observable game
or hypergame; and portfolio of auditors accounts to
maximize payoff and minimize risk using actual payoff of
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q)CQ + (l-t) (1-
q)^ <







[CA1 C^Q + rpC(1-r)pnC E + t(l-
P)C° + (l-t) (1-
P)C«* ,
Dh + rpDQE + (1-
r) pDN° + t (1-p) D°ne
+ (l-t) (1-p) d\e ]






















r)pDNQ + t (1-p) D1,
+ (l-t) (1-p) D*0^
NE
]
[CA1 + CB1 + _ rqnC
NQ
' ■•NO
. (1-r)qnC E .
t (1-q) C up + (1-
t) (1-q) C NE ,
rqDNQE + (l-r)qDNQE
+ ** (1-q) S,N°ne + (it)(l-q)DNQNE ]
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A.l Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H L
S °m'°nh [Auditor payoff, [Auditor payoff,
Auditee payoff] Auditee payoff]
b„k H,B,: NQ, Q [C„ + C„ + rpnC™ [CM + C + rqC°E +
L, B-: Q, Q + (l-r)pC°E + t(l- (l-r)qCffE + t(l-
p)CNQNE + (l-t)(l- q)C°NE + (l-t)(l-
P) c he ' 5) C^NE '
D„ + rpD E + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qD° +
r) PD°E + t(l-p)DNQNE t(l-q)D° + (1-
+ (1-t) (1-P)D°ne ] t)(l-q)D\ ]
siyix H'Bi: NQ, Q [CA1 + CB11 + rpnCN0E [CA1 + CBi + rqC°E +
L, B1: Q,NQ + (l-r)pCQE + t(l- (l-rJqnC^ + t(l-
p)CNQNE + (l-t)(l- q)C° + (l-t)(l-
P) Q°ne ' (3)Cnqne ,
Dh + rpDNQE + (1- rqD° + (l-r)qDN0 +
r)pDQE + t(l-p)DN0NE t(l-q)DQ + (1-
+ (1-t) (l-p)DQNE ] t)(l-q)D%NE ]
S1Y1Y H, B1: NQ, Q [CA1 + CB1 + rpnCNQE [CA1 + c81 + rqnCNQE
L, B,: NQ, Q + (l-r)pC°E + t(l- + (l-r)qC°E + t(l-
p)CNQNE + (1-t) (1- q)CNQNE + (l-t)(l-
P)C°ME ' q)CV '
Dh + rpDNQE + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qDQE +
r) PD°E + t(l-p)DNQNE t(l-q)DNQ + (1-
+ (1-t) (l-p)D°HE ] t) (1-q) D NE ]
S1Y1Z H'B1: NQ/ Q [CA1 + CB1 + rpnCNQE [CA1 + CB1 + rqnCNQE
L, B1: NQ,NQ + (1-r) pC°E + t(l- + (1-r) qnC E +
p)CNQNE + (l-t)(l- t(1-q) C ye + (1-
P)C°NE , t) (1—q) C NE ,
Dh + rpDNQE + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qDNQE
r)pDQE + t(l-p)DNQNE + t(l-q)DNQNE + (1-
S1Z1K
+ (1-t) (l-p)DQNE ] t) (l-q)DN0N|T]
H,B,: NQ, NQ [CA1 + CB1 + nrpnCNQE [CA1 + C?1 + rqC°E +L, B,: Q, Q + (1-r) pnC E + (l-rJqC^ + t(l-
t (1—p) C up + (1- q) c°NE + (l-t)(l-
t) (1—p) C NE , q)CQNE ,
Dh + rpD E + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qD°
r)PDNQE + t(l- t(l-q)D° + (1-
p)DNQNE + (l-t)(l- t)(l-q)D\ ]
P) DNQNE
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A.l Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H L
S °m'°nm [Auditor payoff, [Auditor payoff,
Auditee payoff] Auditee payoff]
s„„ H,B,: NQ,NQ [C„ + c„, + rpnC»°E [C„ + CBk+ rqC° +
L, B.: Q,NQ + (l-r)pnCNQ + (l-r)qnCN0E + t(l-
t (l~p) C up + (1- q)C° + (l-t)(l-
t)d-P)cfNE, q)cfm ,
Dh + rpDN0E + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qDNQE +
r)pDN0E + t(l- t(l-q)D° + (1-
P) Dnqne + (l-t)(l- t)(l-q)D*°NE ]
P)dNQme 1
H,B,: NQ,NQ [C„ + c,, 4. rpnC»°E [C„ + C + rqnC»»E
L, B.: NQ, Q + (1-r)pnCN E + + (l-r)qC° + t(l-
t (l-p) C uc + (1- q)CNQNE + (l-t)(l-
tJCl-pJC^ , q)C° ,
Dh + rpD ° + (1- rqD F + (l-r)qDQE +
r)pDN°E + 1(1- t(l-q)DN° + (1-
p)DNQNE + (1-t) (1- t) (l~q) D NE ]
P)DNQNE ]
s1z12 H, B,: NQ,NQ [CA1 + CB1 + rpnCN°E [CA1 + CB1 + rqnCNQE
L, B.: NQ, NQ + (1-r) pnC ° + + (l-r)qnCNQE +
t (l-p) C up + (1- t (1-q) C up + (1-
t) (l-p)ClWNE , t) (1—q) C NE ,-iNQ Nt . fi »-„r>NQ . / i _ — \
S1K2K
Dh + rpD F + (1- rqD E + (l-r)qDNUE
r)pDNQE + t(l- + t(l-q)DN° + (1-
p)DN° + (l-t)(l- t) (l-q)DN° ]
p)Dnune ]
H, B,: Q, Q [CA1 + C + rpC E + [CA1 + vqC° + (1-
L,B,: Q, Q (1-r) pC E + t(l- v) qC°E + wfl-qJC0^
p)C°NE + (l-t)(l- + (l-w)(l-q)Ctl ,
P)C°NE , vqDQE + (1-v) qD E H
D„ + rpD° + (1- w(l-q)D° + (1-
r)pDQE + t (l-p) D°ne w)(l-q)D\ ]
+ (1-t) (l-p)D°NE ]
S1K2X H'B1: Q' Q C CA1 + C,B1 + rPC°E + tCA1 +NQVqCQE +
L,B2: Q,NQ (1-r) pC E + t(l- v) qnC E + w(l-
p)C°NE + (l-t)(l- q)CQ + (1-w) (1-
P)C°NE ' q)C KE '
Dh + rpD° + (1- vqD°£ + (l-v)qDNQE
r)pDQE + t(l-p)DQNE w(l-q)DQ + (1-
+ (1-t) (l-p)D°NE ] w)(l-q)D^NE ]
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A.1 Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H




















[CA1 + C*1 + +
(l~r)pC E + t(l-
[ CAi + vqnC
NO
,.--t v)qC°E + w(l-q)c'




P) cQne . o
D„ + rpD E + (1-
r)pDQE + t(l-p)D°




[CA1 + CB1 + rpC E +31(l-r)pC E + t(l-
P) C°NE + (1-t) (1-
P)C°NE ' „
Dh + rpD , + (1-
r) pD°E + t (1-p) D®
+ (1-t)(1-p)D° )
NE
Q,NQ [CA1 + C + rPC°E
Q, Q (l-r)pnC E + t(l
p)C° + (l-t) (l-
P>C"",E ■„ ,Dh + rpD E + (1-
r)PDN° + t (I-P) D°ne
+ (1-t) (l-p)D*QNE ]
Q,NQ [CA1 + cB. + rpC°E +
Q,NQ (1-r)pnC E + t(l-
p)CQ + (1-t) (1-
P)=""»E ■-






NQ + t (1—p) D
-€) (l-p) D NE
NE
]
rpC'A1 ' CB1 + F
(1-r)pnC E + t(l-








vqDNQE + (l-v)qDaE +
w (1-q) D uE + (1-
w) (1-q) D NE ]
[CA1 NQ ------ t






+ w(l-q)DNQNE + (1-
w) (1-q) D NE ]
Ccai Q+ vqC% + (1-v)qC E + w(1-q)C
+ (1-w) (1-q) C®





v)qnC E + w(l
(1-w)
vqD E + (1-v)
w(1"q)DV +
w)(l-q)D™,E ]
[C41 + vqnCNQE + (1--A
v)qC E + w(1-Q)C
+ (1-w) (1-q) <?
>NQ
NE
vqDNQE + (1-v) qDuE +
NEn
w (1-q) D uE + (1-
w) (i-q) D NE ]
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A.1 Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H



















Q,NQ [CA1 + CB +
NQ,NQ (1-r)pnC E + t(l-
p)C° + (1-t) (1-
P)C*





Dh + rpD" + (1-






CCA1 + CBi + rp"0
NQ
+ (1-r) pC°, + t(l-
iNQ + (1-t)(1-p!So«eP) C NE ■ uq
Dh + rpD _ + CI¬
NQ
r)PDE + t(1-p)D




(CA1 + C,B1 rpnCNQEn i o i n - t.
+ (1-r)pC E + t(l-
P)Cnqne + (l-t) (1-
P) C NE
D + rpDNQE + (1-n n
r) pDQE + t(1—p)DNQ




[ CA1 + CB1 + rPnC
NQ
"
+ (1-r) pCQE + t(l-
p)CNQNE + (1-t) (l-
P)C°NE
|NQ
Dh + rpDN0E + (1-
r)pD°E + t (1-p) Dr










Dh + "rpDNUE + (1-
r)pDQE + t (1-p) Dr




- ~A1 "ruovvdliW E + ^
v)qnC E + w(l-
q)CNQNE + (1-w) (1-
q) C
vqDNQEE + (1 -v) qDMQE
+ w(l-q)DMQNE + (1
w
W(!-qju NE ■
w) (1-q) D ME ]
[CA1 + vqC° + (1-
v) qC E + wfl-q)C°NE
+ (1-w)(1-q)e ,
vqD°E + (1-v) qD E +
w(l-q)D° + (1-
w) (l-q)D\ ]
[CA1 + vqC°E + (
v) qnCNQE + w(l-
q)cQ + (l-w) (:
<3)CqNE 'vqDQE + (l-v)qE
w(l-q)DQ + (1
w) (1-q) w ME ]
[CA1 + vqnCNQE +
v) qC°E + wCl-qJC1 NE
+ (l-w) (1-q) C?ME ,
vqDNQ + (1-v) qD E +
Jq1-
w(l-q)DNQ +
w) (1-q) D NE ]
(1-













A.1 Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H










NQ,NQ [C„ + c„ + rpnC*°ENO
Q, Q + (1-r) pnC" E .
+ (1-t ( 1-p) C up
t) (l-p)C* ,
°H + PD"°E+ (1-















Q,NQ + 1-r) jpQnCNUE +
t) (l-pJC1^ ,







[CA1 + vqC° + (1-
v)qC°E + w (1-q) C NE
+ (1-w) (1-q) CT ,





[ CA1 +..vqC°E + (1-
v)qnC E + w(l-
q)C° + (1-w) (1-
q)c' ME '





NQ,NQ [Ca1 + CB1 + rpnC
NQ, Q + (1-r) pnCNQE +














[CA1 + vqnC E + Jl-
V) qC E + w(l-q)<rQ
+ (1-w)(1-q)C
NE
vqDNQ£ + (1-v) qDuE +
w(l-q)DN0 + (1-





NQ, NQ [CA1 + CB1
NQ, NQ + (l-r)pnCNQ, +
t ( I-P) C up
t) (i-p) c NE ,
D„ + rpDNQp + (1-
r)PDN0E + 1(1-


















+ w (1-q) D1NQ




2K1K H,B2: Q, Q [Ca1 + vpCQ + (1-
L,B,: Q, Q v) pC°E + w (1-p) C°
+ (1-w) (1-p) Cf
NE
NE
H +„VP°E + (!"D
v)pDuE + w(1-p) Dl
+ (i-w) (i-p)dqne ]
NE
(CA1 + C#1 +(1-r)qC E«\r.Q _L /q)C°>E + '(1-












Q, Q [CA1 + vpC° + (1-
Q,NQ V) PC°E + w (1-p) C°NE
+ (1-W)(l-pJC0^ ,
D„ + vpDQE + (1-
v) PD°E + w(1-p) Dqne
+ (1-w) (1-p) Dqne ]
[CA1 C|.Iq + rqC(l-r)qnC E + t(l-
+ (1-t) CI¬
NE NO









[CA1 + vpC°E + (1-
v) PC E + w fl-p) C NE
+ (1-w) (l-p)CQNE ,
D„ + vpDQE + (1-
v)pD° + w(l-p) Dr
+ (1-w) (l-p)DuNE ]
NE
tCA1 + CB1 + r<3nC
NQ
'8
+ (1-r) qC°E + t(l-
q)cNQ + (1-t)(1-
o "E
q) c NE '
rqD E + (1-r) qDQE
t(l-q)DNQ + (1-
t) (1-q) D NE ]
*2K1Z H'B2:
L, B1:
Q, Q [CA1 + VPCQ + (1-
NQ,NQ V) pC°E + wfl-p)CQNE





NQCCA1 + CB1 + r£3nC+ (1-r)qnC
t (1-q) C up
t) (1-q) C NE.NO - -Nt
NQ
+ (1-
v) pD E + w (1-p) D NE rqDN0E + (l-r)qD1
+ (1-w) (l-p)DQME ] + t(l-q)DNQNE + I(1
t) (1-q) D uE ]
'2X1K H,B2:
L, B1:
Q,NQ [Ca1 + _vpCQE + (1-





dh + ..ypD E + (i-
V)PDNQE + w(1-p) Dune
+ (1-w) (1-p) D^°ne ]
(CA1 + SI + E
















Du + vpD" + (1-
V) pD E + w (1-p) D NE
+ (1-w) (1-p) D%e ]








A.l Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H








[CA1 +NQVpC°E + <1_ tCA1.+ CB1_„+ rcJnC'NQv)pnC"uE + w(l-
p)C° + (1-w) (1-
P'C <„
Dh + vpD E + (1-
v)PDNQE + w(l-p)DQNE
+ (1-w) (1-p) D"qne ]
+ (1-r) qC°E + t(l-
q)CNQNE + (1-t) (1-
q) c°NE ,
rqD , + (1-r)qD Ec
. tin _ cNQt(l-q)D'





Q,NQ [CA1 + vpC E + CI¬
NQ, NQ v) pnCNQE + w(l-
p)C° + (1-w) (1-
P)C NE '
DH + vpD E + (1-
[ CA1 + cbi +..~ rqnC
NQ
NQ+ (1-r)qnC E .
t (1-q) C up + (1-
t) (Jj-q) * , nq
rqD E + (l_-r) qD E
v)PDNQE +Ew(l-p)DQNE + t(l-q)DNQNE + (1







[CA1 + vpnCNQE +
v)pC° + w (1-p) C
+ (l-w)(l-p)C0NE
Dh + vpD E + (1-
V)pDQE + W (1-p) D





[CA1 + ^81 +(1-r)qC c +
rqC E
t(l-
q) c WE + (i-t) (i-
q)Cr









A1 ' VPnC E ,Q,Q + w(l-p)crQ
NQ, Q [CA +
Q,NQ v)pC'E .
+ (l-w)U-p)C„
Dh + vpD E + (1-
v) pDQE + w (1-p) D1






+ CJ.lo + rqC(1-r)qnC E + t(l-













[CA1 + vpnCNQE +
v)pC E + w(1-p)C
+ (1-w) (1-P)C°NE ,
Dh + vpD E + (1-
V) PD°E + w (1-p) Dnqne
+ (1-w) (l-p)DQNE ]
[CA1 + CB1 Q+ rt3nCNQ
+ (1-r) qC E + t(l-
q)CNQNE + (1-t) (1-
q) c°ue /
rqD E + (1-r) qD F
t(l-q)DNQ + (1-
t) (1-q) D NE ]
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H






NQ, Q [CA1 + vpnCN0E + (1-
NQ,NQ v) pC°E + w(l-p)CW0ME
+ (l-w)(l-p)C°NE
"
+ vpD , + (1-
^r.0 a. tI/1_«MYN
D V %
v) pD°E + w(l-p)DNQNE
+ (1-w) (1-p) D°ne ]


















































+ (1- [CA1 + Cal + rqc8,
E + wCl-
+ (1-w)(1-





+ W ( 1 —
+ (1-W)(1-
]



































[CA1 + vpnCNUE + (1--.NQ wfl-pnC E
C» , + (1-W) (1-
NE
+ vpDN0E + (1-
+ w( 1-pDNQE
Dnqne + (1-w) (1-
DNQ 1u
NE J
q)^NEq) ^NE ' g
rqD E + (l-r)qD°E
t(l-q)D°^ (1-t) (l-q)D' NE
(i- [CA1 + rqC°ECBI.Q +
(1-r)qnC E + t(l-
q)C° + (l-t)(l-
q) C! "E ' NQ
rqD E + (1-r)qD E
t(l-q)D° + (1-
t) (1-q) NE ]
CCA1 + CB1 + rqnCN°
+ (l-r)qC°E + t(l-
q) cNQ + (1-t)(1-
n NE
q) ,
rqD E + (l-r)qDQE
t(l-q)DNQ + (I-"
t) (1-q) D NE ]






t) (1—q) C NE ,
rqDNQ + (1-r) qD E
+ t(l-q)DN° + (1
t)(1—q)DNQNE ]
210








Q, Q [CA1 + VPC°E + (1-
Q, Q v)pC°E + w (1-p) C NE
+ (l-w) (l-p)C°NE ,
Dh + vpDQE + (1-
v)pDQE + w(1-p) Dr
+ (l-w) (1-P)D°ne ]
NE
[CA1 vqC° + (1-
+ w(1-q)v) qC E ■ " v - he
+ (l-w) (1-q) C? ,





Q, Q [CA1 + vpC° + (1-
Q,NQ v)pCQ + w(1-p) Cr
+ (l-w)(1-p)CQ
NE
Dh + vpD E +
NE
(1-
v)pD E + w(1-p)D






+ W ( 1 —
(l-w)(1-
NQ
vqD E + (1-v)qD
w(l-q)DQ + (1-
w) (1-q) Er0ME ]
2K2Y H,B2:
L, B2:
Q, Q [CA1 + vPC° + (1-
NQ, Q v) pC°E + wfl-p)CQNE
+ (1-W) (l-p)C°NE ,
D„ + vpDQE + (1-
v) PD°E + w(1-p) Dqne
+ (l-w) (l-p)D°NE ]
[CA1 + VC*nC E + Jl-v)qC°E + w(l-q)CWQ
+ (l-w) (1-q) CT
NE











Q, Q [CA1 + vPc° + (l-
NQ,NQ v) pC°E + W(l-p) C0,
+ (l-w) (l-p)CQNE
Dh + vpDQE + (1-
v)pDQE + w(1-p) Dc




+ W ( 1 —
(1-W)(1-
Q,NQ [CA1 + vpC
Q, Q v) pnCNQE
P)CQME +
Dh + vpDQE + (1-
v) pDN0E + w (1-p) D°ne










+ w (1-q) Dn°ne -
w) (l-q) Dnqne ]
[CA1 + vqC E + (1-
v) qC°E + w (1-q) C NE
+ (l-w)(l-q)c\ ,




A.1 Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H






Q,nq [Ca1 + vpc°E + (1-
Q,NQ v)pnCNQE + w(l-
p)C° + (1-w) (1-
PIC""*
Du + vpD°, + (1-
■»NQ xE,,M_»\nO
' v c ' V
v) pDNQE + w(l-p) D'
+ (1-w) (1-p) DMne
NE
]
[CA1 +..vqCQE + (1-
v)qnCNQE + w (1—
















Dh + vpD E + (1-
v)pDNQE + w (1-p) D1
+ (1-w) (1-p) DhQNE
NE
]
tCA1 ^ vv*llv- E T
v)qC E + w(l-q)C
vqnCNQE L
+ (1-w)(1-q)C
vqDNQE + J1-V) qDuE
NJn
w(l-q)DNQ + (1-

























[CAi + vpnCNQE + (1-
v)pC E + w(1-p)C
NQ
(1-w)(l~p)C




v)pDuE + w(1-p) D1








^ CA1 NQv)qnCNQE +
q) CNOnE + (i-w) i-1--
q) C
vqDNQEE+' (1-v) qDNQE
+ w(l-q)DNQNE + (1-
w) (1-q) D NE ]
[CA1 + vqC° + (1-
v) qC E + w (l-q) c ne
+ (1-w) (1-q)C\ ,
vqDQE + (1-v) qD E +
w (1-q) D° + (1-
w) (1-q) u NE ]
'2Y2X H,B2:
L, B2:






H + VP°E +
NE
(1-
NQV)pD E + w(1-p)D














A.1 Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H























[CA1 + vpnCN0E + (1-
v) pC°E + w(l-p) Cr°ME
+ (1-w) ^-P)C ne -
Dh + vpD E + (l-









Dh + vpD E + (1-
v)pD°E + w(l-pQ)DNQ
NE




[CA1 + vpnCN° + (1-
NQ,NQ
Q,NQ





























Dnqne + (1-w) (1-
NE



















JL1-Ccai + vqnCN0E +v)qC°E + w(l-q)
+ (l-w)(l-q)(?neq,vqDNQE + (l-v)qDQ. +
NE
.NQw (1-q) D uE




^C*1 NO " ?v)qnCNQE + w (1
q)CNQNE + (1-w) (1-
q)cNQNE ,
vqDNQE + (l-v)qDNQE
+ w(l-q)DN0NE + (1-
w) (1-q) D NE ]
[CA1 + vqC° + (1-
v) qC E + w(l-g)C°NE
+ (l-w)(l-q)CQ ,









NQ E ■ (1~
E + W(1—











w) (l~q) D NE ]
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A.l Auditor-Auditee Game in Normal Form
H L
S °m'°nm [Auditor payoff, [Auditor payoff,
Auditee payoff] Auditee payoff]
s222z H,B2: NQ,NQ [Ca1 + vpnCN0 + (1- [CA1 + vqnCM0 + (1-
L, B2: NQ,NQ v)pnCN0E + w(l- v) qnCN° + w(l-
P><5« + (l-w) (1- q)d« + (l-w)(l-
D„' C+ "$pb« + (1- +' (1-v) qD«%
v) pDNQE + w(l- + w(1-q) Dnqne + (1-
p)DN0NE + (l-w) (1- w) (1-q) Dnqne ]
P)DNQme 1
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A.2 Choice of strategies
Table 1
Noil-Coop Coop
H L H L
Min Min Min Min
Table.1 11.50 18.80 56.50 30.50
.2 19.50 23.80 64.50 38.50
. 3 19.50 24 .78 64 . 50 35.50
.4 16. 50 23.80 61.50 38.50
.5 16.50 24.78 61.50 35.50
MINIMUM 11.50 18.80 56.50 30.50
Fixed parameters
Dh = 35 D°e = 220 °qne = 40 Dnqne = 10
ca1 = 5 C=1 - 3 C'e = 20 C° =^ ne 40 Cnqne = 10
p = 0.05 q = 0.35
r = 0.95 t = 0.10 v = 0 .80 W = 0.25
Variable parameters














































A.2 Choice of strategies
Table 1 .2
H H L L H L
Audi- Audi- Audi- Audi- Coop Coop
tor tee tor tee
S1|(1|( 47.00 160.00 41.00 155.00 207.00 196.00
S1K1X 47.00 160.00 23.80 86.98 207.00 110.78
S1|C1y 47.00 160.00 45.70 78.03 207.00 123.73
S1|(1Z 47.00 160.00 28.50 10.00 207.00 38.50
S1X1|C 21.40 65.43 41.00 155.00 86.83 196.00
S1X1X 21.40 65.43 23.80 86.98 86.83 110.78
S1x1y 21.40 65.43 45.70 78.03 86.83 123.73
S1X1Z 21.40 65.43 28.50 10.00 86.83 38.50
S1y1|C 45.10 139.58 41.00 155.00 184.68 196.00
S1y1x 45.10 139.58 23.80 86.98 184.68 110.78
S1y1y 45.10 139.58 45.70 78.03 184.68 123.73
S1y1z 45.10 139.58 28.50 10.00 184.68 38.50
S1Z1K 19.50 45.00 41.00 155.00 64.50 196.00
S1Z1X 19.50 45.00 23.80 86.98 64.50 110.78
S121y 19.50 45.00 45.70 78.03 64.50 123.73
S1Z1Z 19.50 45.00 28.50 10.00 64.50 38.50
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A.2 Choice of strategies
Table 1 .3
H H L L H L
Audi- Audi- Audi- Audi- Coop Coop
tor tee tor tee
S1K2K 47.00 160.00 38.00 155.00 207.00 193.00
S1K2X 47.00 160.00 24.78 86.68 207.00 111.45
S1|C2y 47.00 160.00 38.73 78.33 207.00 117.05
S1K2Z 47.00 160.00 25.50 10.00 207.00 35.50
S1X2K 21.40 65.43 38.00 155.00 86.83 193.00
S1X2X 21.40 65.43 24.78 86.68 86.83 111.45
S1x2y 21.40 65.43 38.73 78.33 86.83 117.05
S1X2Z 21.40 65.43 25.50 10.00 86.83 35.50
S1y2(C 45.10 139.58 38.00 155.00 184.68 193.00
S1Y2X 45.10 139.58 24.78 86.68 184.68 111.45
S1y2Y 45.10 139.58 38.73 78.33 184.68 117.05
S1Y2Z 45.10 139.58 25.50 10.00 184.68 35.50
S1Z2X 19.50 45.00 38.00 155.00 64.50 193.00
S1Z2X 19.50 45.00 24.78 86.68 64.50 111.45
S1Z2Y 19.50 45.00 38.73 78.33 64.50 117.05
S1Z2Z 19.50 45.00 25.50 10.00 64.50 35.50
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A.2 Choice of strategies
Table 1 .4
H H L L H L
Audi- Audi- Audi- Audi- Coop Coop
tor tee tor tee
S2K1|C 44.00 160.00 41.00 155.00 204.00 196.00
S2K1X 44.00 160.00 23.80 86.98 204.00 110.78
S2|(1Y 44.00 160.00 45.70 78.03 204.00 123.73
S2K1Z 44.00 160.00 28.50 10.00 204.00 38.50
S2X1|C 22.83 79.53 41.00 155.00 102.35 196.00
S2X1X 22.83 79.53 23.80 86.98 102.35 110.78
S2x1y 22.83 79.53 45.70 78.03 102.35 123.73
S2X1Z 22.83 79.53 28.50 10.00 102.35 38.50
S2Y1K 37.68 125.48 41.00 155.00 163.15 196.00
S2y1x 37.68 125.48 23.80 86.98 163.15 110.78
S2y1Y 37.68 125.48 45.70 78.03 163.15 123.73
S2Y1Z 37.68 125.48 28.50 10.00 163.15 38.50
S2Z1(C 16.50 45.00 41.00 155.00 61.50 196.00
S2Z1X 16.50 45.00 23.80 86.98 61.50 110.78
S2z1y 16.50 45.00 45.70 78.03 61.50 123.73
S2Z1Z 16.50 45.00 28.50 10.00 61.50 38.50
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A. 2 Choice of strategies
Table 1 .5
H H L L H L
Audi- Audi- Audi- Audi- Coop Coop
tor tee tor tee
S2K2K 44.00 160.00 38.00 155.00 204.00 193.00
S2K2x 44.00 160.00 24.78 86.68 204.00 111.45
S2K2Y 44.00 160.00 38.73 78.33 204.00 117.05
S2K2Z 44.00 160.00 25.50 10.00 204.00 35.50
S2X2|C 22.83 79.53 38.00 155.00 102.35 193.00
S2X2X 22.83 79.53 24.78 86.68 102.35 111.45
S2x2y 22.83 79.53 38.73 78.33 102.35 117.05
S2X2Z 22.83 79.53 25.50 10.00 102.35 35.50
S2Y2K 37.68 125.48 38.00 155.00 163.15 193.00
S2Y2X 37.68 125.48 24.78 86.68 163.15 111.45
S2Y2Y 37.68 125.48 38.73 78.33 163.15 117.05
S2Y2Z 37.68 125.48 25.50 10.00 163.15 35.50
S2Z2K 16.50 45.00 38.00 155.00 61.50 193.00
S2Z2x 16.50 45.00 24.78 86.68 61.50 111.45
S2z2y 16.50 45.00 38.73 78.33 61.50 117.05
S2Z2Z 16.50 45.00 25.50 10.00 61.50 35.50
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A.3 Extracts of choice of combined strategies
Table 2
Non-Coop Coop
H L H L
Min Min Min Min
Table .1 15.80 20.31 60.80 60. 60
.2 21. 62 25.31 68.80 68 . 60
. 3 21. 62 30.80 68.80 65.60
.4 20.80 25.31 65.80 68.60
.5 20.80 30.80 65.80 65.60
MINIMUM 15.80 20.31 60.80 60.60
Variable Darameters
Cnq£ = 12 6 Dnqe = 10 n = 1.00
Table 2 .1










































































H L H L
Min Min Min Min
1 15.85 20. 32 60. 85 60.95
2 21. 62 25.32 68.85 68.95
3 21.62 30.87 68.85 65.95
4 20.85 25.32 65.85 68.95
5 20.85 30.87 65.85 65.95
15.85 20.32 60.85 60.95
Variable parameters
Cnqe = 127 Dnqe = 10 n = 1.00
Table 3
H H L L H L
S Audi- Audi- Audi- Audi- Coop Coop
tor tee tor tee
S1|C 42.00 160.00 36.00 155.00 202.00 191.00
S1X 16.62 65.43 20.32 86.98 82.04 107.30
S1y 44.23 139.58 69.29 78.03 183.76 147.32
S1Z 18.85 45.00 53.95 10.00 63.85 63.95
S2K 39.00 160.00 33.00 155.00 199.00 188.00
S2X 18.70 79.53 25.87 86.68 98.22 112.54
S2Y 36.16 125.48 58.09 78.33 161.63 136.41
S2Z 15.85 45.00 50.95 10.00 60.85 60.95
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A.4 Extracts of choice of joint strategies
Table 4
Non--Coop Coop
H L H L
Min Min Min Min
Table .1 16.65 20.60 61.65 66.55
.2 21.66 25.60 69.65 74.55
.3 21.66 31.99 69.65 71.55
.4 21.65 25.60 66. 65 74.55
.5 21.65 31.99 66.65 71.55
MINIMUM 16.65 20.60 61.65 66.55
Variable parameters
pNQ _
E 14 3 Dnqe = 10 n = 1.00
Table 4 . 1
H H L L H
S Audi¬ Audi- Audi¬ Audi- Coop
tor tee tor tee
S1K 42.00 160 .00 36.00 155.00 202.00
S1X 16. 66 65. 43 20. 60 86.98 82.08
S1Y 44.99 139 .58 74.95 78.03 184.57
S1Z 19.65 45. 00 59.55 10.00 64.65
S2K 39. 00 160 .00 33 . 00 155.00 199.00
S2X 18 . 86 79. 53 26.99 86.68 98.38
S2Y 36.80 125 .48 62.57 78.33 162.27












A.4 Extracts of choice of joint strategies
Table 5
Non-Coop Coop
H L H L
Min Min Min Min
Table .1 16. 66 20.62 61.70 66.90
.2 21.66 25.62 69.70 74.90
.3 21. 66 32.06 69.70 71.90
.4 21.70 25.62 66.70 74 .90
.5 21.70 32.06 66.70 71.90
MINIMUM 16.66 20. 62 61.70 66.90
Variable parameters
Cnqe = 144 Dnqe = 10 n = 1.00
Table 5 .1
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